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Chapter I - Introduction 
 
Coffee has an enormous impact on millions of producers around the world by providing 
livelihoods, at the same time traditional shade coffee provides hundreds of thousands of 
hectares of habitat (Toledo and Moguel, 2012). Coffee bears significant economic and 
environmental influence because it is the world’s second most traded commodity, 
employing 25 million people (O’Brien and Kinnaird, 2003). The demands of the coffee 
market are driven by consumers’ preferences and advertising campaigns, which 
ultimately impact the decisions of coffee growers around the world.  
Bolivia’s coffee producers entered this market in the 1950s and in doing so, they entered 
into one of the world’s most competitive and complex markets, one in which price, 
quality, and the changing demand of coffee consumers dictate the incomes of small 
producers (Petchers and Harris, 2008). Globally, small coffee producers have sought 
refuge from the conventional coffee market by participating in the growing specialty 
market. The specialty market is comprised of both high quality and certified coffees, 
which set themselves apart from the conventional coffee market.  The most popular 
certifications are organic and Fair Trade. These certifications allow conscientious 
consumers to connect their purchases with the moral or ethical values they hold. Organic 
and Fair Trade certifications are part of a larger movement of alternative markets, in 
which multiple products, promote the well-being of the producer and the environment 
instead of high productivity and profits (Raynolds, 2000). Fair Trade certification tries to 
secure the well being of producers by providing premium prices, price floors, financing, 
and technical support. In much the same way, organic certification rewards producers 
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with a premium price for sustainable agricultural practices meant to preserve and protect 
the environment. These standards are enforced by third-party certifiers, which evaluate 
the producer’s compliance with the certifications norms.  
While participation in these markets has its benefits, the quantities certified are small.  
Fair Trade coffee makes up only 1.4 percent of the total coffee market (Pierrot et al., 
2011).  Certification also coffee does not resolve all the challenges faced by the small 
coffee producer. Case studies from around the world have revealed that Organic and Fair 
Trade certification do have some potential for reducing poverty and providing greater 
economic stability for coffee producers, however, these gains are often marginal (Bacon 
et al., 2008; Barham et al, 2011;Blackman et al., 2005; Jaffee, 2007; Martinez- Torres, 
2008).  
Coffee literature is replete with studies that analyze the problem of marginal benefits of 
alternative trade, including economic, anthropologic and social studies. A popular 
research approach to analyze alternative coffee markets is global commodity chain 
(GCC) analysis. These studies look at the organizations and relationships involved in the 
production, processing, trade, sale and marketing of coffee.  Studies show that the 
success of Organic and Fair Trade markets depend on a number of factors including 
global prices and local conditions, as well as local and national institutions which affect 
the commercialization of coffee (Raynolds, 2002; Taylor, 2005; Barham et al., 2011). 
The degree of success of coffee markets is unique to economic and political condition of 
each country in question. In order to understand how producers are exposed to economic 
challenges, an analysis of the individual country commodity chains is necessary. As such, 
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this research will investigate the economic and political issues underlying the coffee 
marketing process in Bolivia, with a special focus on the multiple commodity chains 
involved in coffee commercialization. The main purpose of this research is to identify 
market weaknesses and local challenges concerning organic and Fair Trade coffee 
producers.  
A Bolivian coffee producer faces many of the same challenges participating in alternative 
trade as producers in other Latin American countries. Existing research suggests that 
inadequate premium prices, financing, and the efficacy of domestic coffee organizations 
are culprits in diluting the benefits of coffee certification (Raynolds, 2002; Taylor et al., 
2005; Ponte, 2002; Mutersbaugh, 2002).  Premium prices are designed to provide 
producers participating in Organic and Fair Trade market with sufficient income to meet 
their daily needs and to cover the additional costs of production. However, there is a 
debate as to whether these premiums cover all of the internal and external costs of 
production (Mutersbaugh, 2002; Raynolds, 2000). Financing is also critical to 
participating in certified coffee markets. Financing is meant to help producers smooth 
income over the course of the year. However, the financing provided is limited and places 
the cost of financing on the producer. At the same time the kind of financing offered by 
Fair trade does not support long-term investment, which is critical to the industry 
(Barham et al., 2011).  Also at issue are the internal tensions that exist between market 
participants affecting the ability of the certifications to deliver on their economic promise 
to producers (Mendez et al., 2010). Issues include a lack of transparency and trust 
between marketing institutions, which undermine the principles of Organic and Fair 
Trade markets (Jaffee, 2007; Mutersbaugh, 2002; Raynolds, 2004). Adding to the 
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tensions of market participation is the issue of coffee quality. While not a requirement of 
Fair Trade or organic certification per se, coffee buyers have discretion to impose 
specification on the quality of the coffee they accept. These quality criteria represent an 
additional cost to producers and cooperatives, which in turn reduce the benefit of 
certification (Ronald 1997; Mutersbaugh 2002). 
 One of the key factors that influence the success of organic and Fair Trade certification 
is government support. Many Latin American countries had used coffee exports as a 
means of economic development since the 19thcentury (Williams, 1994). The economic 
success that emerged from the coffee production was attributed to the government 
support that the industry was afforded.  Countries centralize their coffee industries with 
the creation of coffee banks, national coffee boards, land redistribution, and formation of 
cooperatives as a means of promoting coffee exports and providing rural peasant 
households the ability to develop their land and reduce rural poverty (Barham et al., 
2011).   
The governments of coffee growing nations were willing to make these investments 
because of the globally stable coffee prices. In the 20th Century, stable prices were the 
result of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) that controlled prices through 
production quotas. However, much of this support disappeared following the deregulation 
of the global coffee market in 1989 after the collapse of the ICA (Petchers and Harris, 
2005; Daviron and Ponte, 2005; Jaffee, 2007). The result of this deregulation was a 
collapse in coffee prices. Some producers adopted organic and Fair Trade certifications 
as a survival strategy because of the higher prices these markets offered.  Despite their 
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growth, these markets remain a small portion of global coffee sold (Pierrot, 2011).  The 
growth of the specialty markets has motivated some national governments in the region 
to restore some of their coffee support for producers. In the early 2000s the governments 
of Colombia, Mexico and Central America renewed their support of the coffee industry. 
Although, to a less extent than before the collapse of the ICA. Instead of centralization, 
governments emphasized providing assistance to farmers including financing, technical 
assistance, and processing (Fridell, 2007; Varangis, 2003). Governmental supports are 
key to the long-term success of the coffee industry, because they help to address many of 
the hardships which trade deregulation had caused. For a certified coffee producer, these 
government programs complement the benefits of participation in organic and Fair Trade 
markets (Jaffee, 2007) (Mendez et al., 2010). Producers participating in alternative trade 
systems are already organized therefore they have greater access to government support 
(Varangis et al., 2003). 
 The expansion of government support to coffee producers has not been the case in 
Bolivia. Beyond the lack of government support, Bolivian coffee producers face a 
number of economic challenges that impact the cost of production. The research will 
attempt to identify some of the issues faced by Bolivian coffee growers as a result of 
policies implemented by the national government.  
Unique to each coffee market are the institutions that collect, wash, process and select 
coffee beans before being sold. A key component of Fair Trade is the shortening of the 
chain of institutions that market coffee as a way of preserving higher profits for 
producers. Likewise organic certification pays producers premium prices to compensate 
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for higher production costs. The present study will assess the success of organic and Fair 
Trade cooperatives in removing intermediaries and compensating producers toward the 
incremental costs of production in Bolivia.   
The governments of coffee producing countries face a set of unique economic challenges. 
For example, the Mexican coffee industry struggles with rising labor costs due to 
immigration to the United States (Bacon et al. 2008). In the case of other large coffee 
producers like Colombia and Costa Rica, national governments responded to the collapse 
in coffee prices with government assistance (Fridell, 2007). To combat falling prices 
Colombia’s government focused its support on improving coffee quality and marketing 
the Colombian coffee as superior, to ensure higher prices for its producers. Costa Rica 
alternatively, focused on the welfare of its producers by providing price support as well 
as technical support.  Unlike these countries, coffee in Bolivia was primarily developed 
by international development agencies, such as United States Agency for International 
Development  (USAID) and the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), as 
an alternative crop to coca, as part of the “War on Drugs”.  Bolivia’s national government 
has never played a significant role in supporting the industry. With the absence of 
USAID, removed from Bolivia by the current administration and changes government 
policy on coca, making coca production legal for traditional uses, coca is once again a 
dominant force in Bolivia’s coffee growing regions that impacts coffee production 
through both economic and political forces.  
Beyond its economic impact, coca also affects the health of the environment in the 
region. Unlike coffee, which can be grown in an agroforestry system, coca requires the 
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clearing of tropical forests. Consequently, coca does not provide any of the benefits of 
agroforestry and contributes to the deforestation in the Sud Yungas region a tropical 
valley east of the Andes were the majority of the country coffee is grown.  It is also the 
traditional home of coca production, however a growing number of coca growers are 
abandoning traditional methods of production, shifting to new forms of coca production 
that are more detrimental to the environment. These new methods often do not include 
the construction of terraces and incorporate the application of synthetic inputs including 
herbicides, and pesticides (Dourojeanni, 1992). Without traditional terracing there is 
greater erosion and soil loss. Moreover, the synthetic inputs some coca growers have 
added to the production process contaminate the soil and nearby water sources 
(Dourojeanni, 1992). Coca production in Sud Yungas continues to expand under the 
current administration policy, which allows up to 1,300 square meters of production per 
family.  As more farmers expand coca production, the result is greater deforestation. A 
growing number of producers in Nor Yungas are also moving to non-traditional methods 
of cultivation. This threatens the ecosystems and environmental services of the forests of 
Nor Yungas. 
The present research is conducted in cooperation with the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA-Bolivia).  The IICA-Bolivia is a leader in promoting 
more inclusive and sustainable agricultural policies through its research and partnerships.  
The present study will provide recommendations to address weaknesses within the 
Bolivian coffee market, so that IICA and industry stakeholders can address institutional 
issues, and petition the government for greater participation and support, as well as bring 
attention to the environmental cost of declining coffee production. 
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Section 1.1 Objectives of the Study 
1. Analyze the structure of the coffee market in Bolivia with particular reference to 
organic and Fair Trade coffee.    
2. Assess the institutional and market factors that impact the Organic and Fair Trade 
coffee production in Bolivia. 
3. Make policy recommendations for improving the sustainability of organic and 
Fair Trade coffee production in Bolivia. 
 
Section 1.2 Outline of Thesis 
The thesis will be organized as follows: Chapter II will provide an overview of coffee as 
a crop, and the nature of the conventional coffee market, and the rise of alternative trade 
systems, specifically organic and Fair Trade markets. Also outlined in chapter II are the 
challenges facing global coffee producers, how alternative markets seek to meet the 
needs of producers and some of the common failures of these markets.   Chapter III 
outlines the methods used to conduct the analysis, the framework of the analysis, and the 
method used to select the participants and collect data.  Chapter III will also provide an 
overview of the study area, including the unique local factors that have impacted the 
coffee industry.  Specifically the chapter will outline how coca played an important role 
in Bolivia’s agricultural development and the influence of the international community in 
promoting coffee as an alternative crop to coca. The chapter will also outline the 
environmental importance of coffee and ecological characteristics of the region.  Chapter 
IV will describe the results of the analysis and the factors, which make the Bolivian 
coffee market unique, compared to other Latin American coffee producers. This chapter 
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also includes a summary of the commercialization of coffee in Bolivia, the conduct and 
performance of the participants and the national factors which influence coffee 
production. Chapter V will summarize and address these challenges with policy 
recommendation as well as areas where future research is needed.  
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Chapter II – Introduction to Coffee 
 Coffee is the world’s second most widely traded commodity, only surpassed by 
petroleum. An estimated two billion people consume coffee on a daily basis (Toledo and 
Moguel, 2012). According to the International Coffee Organization (ICO), in 2012 the 
coffee industry was estimated to be worth 173.4 billion dollars.  Coffee is grown on 
approximately 5 million farms around the world, with an estimated 20 million workers 
benefiting from its revenue (Toledo and Moguel, 2012). Over 70 percent of the world’s 
coffee is produced on small family farms, amounting to approximately 11 million 
hectares globally. Coffee represents an immense industry, which impacts the globe (ICO, 
2012). Despite the consumer’s familiarity with coffee, most people are unfamiliar with 
the coffee plant itself and the means by which it is produced. They are also largely 
unaware that the coffee they choose to consume has an immense impact on the coffee 
plants producers grow and the production method producers adopt.  
Section 2.1 Overview of Coffee  
 Coffee is a member of the Coffea genus, and while there are one hundred species 
in that genus, only two species produce the coffee that is consumed; these are: Coffea 
arabica and Coffea robusta, henceforth referred to as C. arabica and C. robusta. Both 
species grow to be bushes or small trees. These species are native to equatorial Ethiopia 
yet thrive in very different environments. Coffea robusta is typically grown in flat areas 
ranging from sea level to 1000 meters above sea level. On the other hand, C. arabica 
grows best in areas that are 600-1600 meters above sea level, mountainous, and with 
temperatures between 15-24 degrees Celsius.  The majority of the world’s C. arabica is 
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grown in Mexico, Central America, South America and South Asia whilst the majority of 
C. robusta production is centered in Africa, Southeast Asia and Brazil (Toledo and 
Moguel, 2012).  
 These two species also differ in the final use of their beans. Coffea robusta is 
commonly used in the production of instant coffee, dark espressos, and as filler in coffee 
blends (i.e. Maxwell House and Folgers).  Coffea robusta is considered to be more bitter 
than C. arabica and it also lacks many of the flavor compounds that give quality coffees 
their distinctive flavor. Although C. robusta has varying degrees of quality, it is still less 
expensive than C. arabica. Coffea robusta was widely popular throughout the 1950-
1980s, yet in today’s market the world’s finest and most sought-after coffees are C. 
arabica (Baldwin, 2009); it is seen largely as the superior variety of coffee because of its 
aroma and acidic content. Throughout time, as consumers’ preferences have changed, 
there has been an overall decline in coffee consumption. Despite this global decline, there 
is a growing demand for specialty coffees, which as mentioned previously, are nearly all 
roasted from C. arabica beans.  
In order to enter the specialty coffee market there are often specific quality standards 
producers must meet for buyers. This is especially true of the Fair Trade market. The C. 
arabica beans are required to undergo a specific processing procedure to ensure quality. 
The process is laborious, much of which is carried out by producers and cooperatives. 
The process includes the harvesting of only ripe berries. Once harvest, the coffee berries 
are sorted to ensure they will not crack when being depulped (removing the beans from 
the berry). Next, the beans are fermented over night. The fermentation process must last 
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the correct length of time between 24-48 hours which depending largely on the ambient 
conduction. The beans are then thoroughly washed and dried. Coffee buyers, especially 
those concerned with quality, prefer a sun drying process.  In the drying process, the 
beans must be moved constantly and evenly distributed on cement patios to ensure 
uniformity. Finally the beans are selected (often by hand) to ensure that all the beans 
from various producers are approximately the same size and of the same quality with no 
crack or flaws.    
The research will focus on the producers and institutions which impact coffee 
production in Bolivia, as they are primarily dedicated to producing coffee for the 
specialty market. To understand the specialty market, a review of the economics, 
geopolitical forces and resulting social movements are presented and discussed.  
Section 2.2 Origins of the Global Coffee Market 
Global coffee prices experienced their first collapse in 1930 in response to the 
Great Depression and World War II (Petchers and Harris, 2007). During this time the 
United States (U.S.) saw the struggle in the region and created an accord with Latin 
American countries to stabilize coffee prices to preventing Nazi influence in these 
countries. The accord became known as the Inter-American Coffee Agreement of 1940. 
The pact governed the coffee system until a new global agreement was established in 
1962, known as the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). The ICA set up a system of 
production quotas for each producing country with an overall global target price called 
“c-price”. If prices fell below the “c-price,” countries agreed to reduce production. 
Conversely, if prices increased, producing countries agreed to meet demand. From 1962-
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1989 coffee was governed by a series of amendments to the original ICA. Throughout 
this period, there was a general increase in demand for coffee as the economies in the 
U.S. and Europe boomed (Petchers and Harris, 2005). The ICA demonstrated its success 
in stabilizing coffee prices, and it accomplished this by holding members to the terms of 
the agreements. That being said, production continued to expand in ICA countries and 
excess coffee was destroyed, stored or sold below the global coffee price to non-ICA 
members, specifically the Soviet Union and its allies (Fridell, 2007). 
Changes in the demand for the variety of coffee beans in the U.S. as well as 
changes in U.S. foreign policy in the 1980’s were leading to disagreements among the 
ICA members. Brazil, the largest producer of coffee, was heavily invested in the full-sun, 
robusta variety and industrialized production method. . However, changing taste 
preferences in the U.S. and Europe for milder coffee shifted demand to shade-grown 
arabica beans (Ponte, 2002). In addition to the shift in taste, the U.S. was adopting a 
foreign policy stance that sought to use the ICA to favor coffee producing allies in 
Central America (Levi and Linton, 2003). Between Brazil’s assured dominance in the 
coffee industry and the shift in U.S. foreign policy negotiations quickly reached an 
impasse, with Brazil refusing to reduce production in favor of Central American 
countries. With no new agreement between members, the quotas and price targets were 
abandoned and ICA collapsed in 1989 (Fridell, 2007).   
Section 2.3 The Global Coffee Market in an Era of Globalization  
 The collapse of the ICA and the coffee market it created ushered in a new era for 
coffee growers. In many respects, the liberalization of the coffee market reflected the 
 14
growing push for development focused around the Washington Consensus, a model of 
democratization and market liberalization implemented by development institutions 
located in Washington, D.C. i.e., the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and U.S. Agency of International 
Development (USAID). However, like any regulated market, deregulation would result in 
market correction. Coffee’s previous price stability had incentivized its adoption as a 
viable economic development measure for growers in many Latin American countries, 
and this was now in jeopardy. Instead of steady prices, coffee producers have faced 
volatile prices in the subsequent 26 years following the collapse of the ICA (see figure 1). 
Producers faced falling prices in the period from 1989-1994, because of the initial effects 
of the collapse (Jaffee, 2007). Coffee prices began to recover for a brief period between 
1994-1998 and then collapsed again because of a global increase in production until 2004 
(Bacon, 2007). 
Jaffee, amongst others, attributes the continuing fall in coffee prices from 1994-
2004 to increased global production beyond global demand, (see figure 1). 
Overproduction had been a long-term trend in the industry even under the ICA. Going 
back as far as 1964, demand for coffee grew by one percent annually, while the global 
coffee supply of grew by three percent annually (Jaffee, 2007). In the post-ICA era, the 
increase in coffee production was driven by dominant coffee producing countries and the 
entrance of new countries. The collapse of the ICA meant that countries no longer were 
restricted by quotas and those new countries considering coffee exports were free to enter 
the coffee market. This period coincided with a period of international developmental 
theory based on the neoliberalism call the “Washington Consensus”. The “Washington 
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Consensus” was coherently outline and coined by John Williamson a World Bank 
economist. He outlined what developing nations should do to succeed in the global 
economy. He prescribed the countries should a) promote macroeconomic stability 
through inflation control and deficit cutting, b) open their economies to the rest of the 
world both in terms of trade and capital c) liberalize domestic factors of production 
through the privatization and deregulated markets (Gore, 2000). Following the 
Washington Consensus development mantra, the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank fostered the expansion of coffee producing countries outside of Latin 
America. In Asia, coffee production increased by 1,000 percent, mainly in Vietnam and 
Indonesia (Jaffee, 2007). Increased productivity also came from Brazil with a focus on 
the industrialization of coffee, including the use of automation and synthetic inputs. This 
boosted Brazil’s total coffee crop to a third of the global output making it the largest 
coffee producer in the world (Petchers and Harris, 2007). 
  At the same time that coffee was flooding the international market, there was a 
significant shift in the institutions that were responsible for managing coffee production. 
Until the 1980s, national governments managed coffee production through organizations 
commonly referred to Instituto do/del Café such as the Instituto Brasileiro do Café, (IBC) 
in Brazil, Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FEDCAFE ) and Instituto 
Mexicano del Café (INMECAFE). These institutos played a key role in the organization 
and commercialization of coffee. These organizations had controlled exports for 
stabilizing domestic prices and influencing international prices (Ponte, 2005). However 
with the push for deregulation, many national governments reduced the influence of these 
institutions over the national coffee market. The vacuum in governance allowed large 
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transnational roasters and international traders more direct access to coffee producers 
(Bacon, 2007). With greater access, transnational roasters increased their involvement in 
the production process. Presently, for commodity coffee, transnational roasters rely on 
international traders to supply them with coffee. These international traders have close 
relationships with international roasters and actively work in producing countries to 
invest in means of production and deal directly with producers, removing intermediaries 
wherever possible. The consolidation of the coffee market within each producing 
countries ensures a consistent supply of coffee for roasters and to reduce costs from 
intermediaries (Bacon, 2007). These conditions in the coffee market have the effect of 
undermining local entrepreneurship in the coffee industry (Ponte, 2001).  Similarly, a 
consolidation of the coffee market occurred at the international level, among international 
roasters and traders. In 1998, forty-nine percent of the coffee roasting and instant coffee 
market were controlled by two firms, Phillip-Morris and Nestle (Daviron and Ponte 
2005). In much the same way, only eight international import-export companies 
controlled fifty-six percent of global coffee trade (Daviron and Pointe 2005).  
The market conditions of abundant supply and the consolidation of the coffee 
supply chain, at both the national and international levels, shifted the distribution of 
profits along the value chain. In 1984 green, or raw, unroasted coffee constituted roughly 
sixty-four percent of the U.S. retail price. In 2004, the price of green coffee accounted for 
only seventeen percent (Petchers and Harris, 2007). At the macro level, studies have 
shown that in the 1990s producing countries earned between 10-12 billion USD of a total 
30 billion USD coffee market. In 2001 however, coffee producing countries received a 
total of 5.5 billion USD of a total 70 billion USD coffee market representing a drop in the 
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coffee market share from 30 percent to less than ten percent (Petchers and Harris, 2007). 
Even as demand for coffee has continued to grow, especially in the specialty coffee 
market only two percent or less of the price of a cup of coffee makes its way to the coffee 
grower (Petchers and Harris, 2007). The trend towards the concentration of profits in the 
hands of large international roasters and international exporters with little accruing to 
producers in a time of declining prices has led to hardship for coffee producers. The 
unfair distribution of profits prompted questions about the equity in the coffee trade 
(Raynolds, 2000). These concerns gave rise to alternative trade models including the 
focus of this study, Fair Trade.  
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counteract the inequity of profits, many small mostly European organizations began to 
purchase products directly from producers and pay them prices that would ensure their 
living standards.  By removing intermediaries and shortening commodities chains more 
of the profit from coffee sales could be accrued to producers. Many of these 
organizations formed in the 1970s and 1980s, and supported communities throughout 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America through the purchases of various crops and products 
(Petcher and Harris, 2007). Amongst these fledgling organizations was the first major 
purchaser of coffee the Dutch organization Max Havelaar in 1989. This organization 
differed in that it not only intended to sell coffee to a close group of fair trade supporters, 
but it also sold to the general public. When the collapse in coffee prices, occurred this 
crisis provided a powerful narrative for Fair Trade coffee and connected it with morally 
conscious buyers. Coffee’s great popularity made it the commodity that brought Fair 
Trade into wider use in Europe. Fair Trade eventually makes its way to the U.S. and other 
developed nations under the moniker Transfair (Fridell, 2007). 
Section 2.5 What is Fair Trade? 
The rapid growth of the Fair Trade market led to a need to clearly define the term 
Fair Trade. In 1997, various national Fair Trade initiatives (which encompassed countries 
in Europe, North America and Asia) coordinated their efforts under the Fair Trade 
Labeling Organization (FLO) (Fridell, 2007). The FLO established requirements for 
buyers and producers in order to label their product with the Fair Trade logo. The most 
important requirement was the guarantee of a minimum price for products, or “price 
floor.” The price floor allows the producer to recoup their production cost and cover their 
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daily needs. The second most important requirement is a payment of a five percent social 
premium, which is used among producers for social and community development 
projects (Barham et al., 2011). Buyers should intend to establish and promote long-term 
contracts and trading relationship with producers as well as provide technical and 
financial support. Producers are also expected to organize themselves according to this 
set of standards. For example, in order to enter the Fair Trade market, producers must 
form democratically organized cooperatives or associations. Both buyers and producers 
are required to be financially transparent and must adhere to FLO requirements, which 
stipulate a prohibition on child labor, freedom of association, collective bargaining for 
workers, and the health and safety of workers under the International Labor Standard, as 
well as non-discriminatory policies. Third party Fair Trade certifiers are responsible for 
ensuring producers and buyers meet these standards.  The Fair Trade market today is 
more fragmented. Fair Trade buyers have divided into two markets. The FLO in charge 
of Fair Trade markets in Europe and Asia, while the US markets is controlled by Fair 
Trade USA.  Fair Trade USA split from FLO citing the desire to expand Fair Trade to the 
workers of larger producers as well as providing access to small independent farmers, 
which previously could not participate in Fair Trade under FLO rules (Fair Trade USA, 
2011).  The changes to the rules governing Fair Trade under Fair Trade USA has draw 
criticism from FLO organization and other alternative market organization. They claim 
that Fair Trade USA standards violates the founding principles of Fair Trade, which are 
meant to promote the development of democratic, and community based production 
organization as a means of enfranchising workers and promoting social benefits. 
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Despite their differences both  FLO and Fair Trade USA have desire to expand 
Fair Trade as a greater share of coffee sales. Both have been successful FLO and  Fair 
Trade USA certified coffee continues to grow in popularity among both buyers and 
producers. According to FLO’s 2013 estimates, collective sales of Fair Trade goods 
represented a total of 5.5 billion Euros (Fair Trade International, 2015). Fair Trade USA 
claims two percent of the U.S. total coffee and five percent of the specialty coffee market 
(FLO-USA, 2013). FLO also estimated that they have 1.4 million farmers participating in 
the production of Fair Trade products (Fair Trade International, 2015). Studies have 
demonstrated that those participating in Fair Trade are able to raise their incomes 
compared to conventional producers (Jaffee, 2007; Bacon, 2005).  These studies also 
exhibit that there are some social benefits from Fair Trade participation; these benefits 
include improved health, increased educational achievement, and enhanced access to 
daily needs and comforts (Jaffee, 2007). In addition, the stable prices provided by Fair 
Trade helped support producers participating in organic production by offsetting the high 
cost of organic production methods and certification; this situation will be discussed in a 
later section. In 2015 minimum price for Fair Trade is 1.40 for washed C. arabica with a 
price premium set 20 cents above the global coffee price per lbs., five cents of which is 
set aside to social programs in the producer’s community.  Despite all the benefits that 
Fair Trade claims to provide producers. These same producers are often only marginally 
better than those participating in the conventional coffee market (Jaffee, 2007; Chamorro, 
2005; Bacon et al. 2008).  Research indicates that FLO’s and Fair Trade USA desire for 
greater mainstream market penetration through the use of large retailers may be the cause 
of the marginal gains to producers (Fridell, 2007). These large retailers include 
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companies like Folgers, Sam's Club, Target, Costco and Starbucks, which negotiate for 
lower Fair Trade coffee prices (Fridell, 2007). The FLO’s ambition to continue the 
growth of the Fair Trade movement is increasingly reliant on large corporate buyers. This 
reliance led to questions of the effectiveness of Fair Trade to meet its goals of ensuring 
the well-being of commodity producers in the global south, especially in their largest and 
most important commodity, coffee (Jaffee, 2007).                                                                                        
Section 2.6 Issues that Exist in Fair Trade 
The enforcement of Fair Trade standards outlined above is administered through a 
third party certifier, FLO-CERT. This certifier meets with producers to evaluate their use 
of the price premium for the betterment of the community. FLO-CERT evaluates the 
governance structure of producer organizations to ensure transparency and audit buyers 
to ensure that payments and financing are being offered to producers in accordance with 
Fair Trade standards.  However, global commodity chain analysis shows that this 
relationship between producers and buyers remains one-sided with buyer largely holding 
economic power over producers.  The one-sided nature of these relationships is one cause 
of strained certification process. These tensions undermined the support intended for 
producers. Adding to these issues are the structural and administrative problems of 
implementing Fair Trade certification (Barham et al, 2011). Some of these tensions and 
institutional issues are outlined below. 
1. Administration and the Timing of Payments: Fair Trade premiums are typically 
paid to producers in two installments a year. The first payment is the anticipo or 
pre-financing, which is meant to finance production, harvesting and daily needs of 
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the producer. This first payment can be up to 60% of the final price of the coffee 
delivered, though in some cases it is less. The next payment comes after the 
coffee has been delivered to buyers. Depending on the organization, a third 
payment can occur if additional coffee is sold to the Fair Trade buyer (Jaffee, 
2007). Even though these payments are meant to occur in a timely manner, the 
cooperatives’ ability to distribute these payments can take an extensive amount of 
time contributing to the hardships of the producers.  
2. Quality and Quantity of Coffee: Fair Trade buyers are not expected nor obligated 
to purchase all of the coffee produced by their Fair Trade partner. In fact the 
majority of the coffee produced by a Fair Trade organization in the majority of 
cases is sold to the conventional market. For instance, many Fair Trade buyers 
can increase or reduce the amount of coffee they buy from producers, based on 
the anticipated demand of their consumers. Fair Trade buyers also have the 
prerogative to decide the quality of coffee they will accept from their producers. 
The need to meet strict quality standards increases the price of production, as 
producing organizations need to process, sort, grade and test their coffee for 
quality (Raynolds, 2002). The fact that the quantity and quality of coffee 
purchased relies solely on the buyers’ discretion can leave many Fair Trade 
producers with excess coffee on hand and a need to find buyers. Cooperatives can 
sometimes find buyers internationally if they have high quality coffee. However, 
if the coffee does not meet strict quality standards it results in selling it for lower 
prices to domestic buyers (Jaffee, 2007). The sale of coffee to local buyers creates 
challenges for producers because it exposes them to volatile coffee prices.  
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3. International and Government Support: By virtue of their level of organization 
many Fair Trade organizations also benefit from having access to international 
and national programs that support producers. Often international 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and national government programs will 
work with producers’ organization. This is owed largely to the ease of working 
with organizations to implement government programs rather than with individual 
farmers. These programs can provide a range of benefits to producers including 
technical assistance, mechanization, and access to credit, and in some cases they 
even provide social benefits payments. This further complicates an evaluation of 
Fair Trades’ benefits given these government transfers (Mendez et al., 2010).  
4. Dedication: Both Buyers and Producer are not bound completely to the Fair Trade 
market, buyers are free to source coffee from around the world or choose to buy 
from outside of the market. In much the same pay producers can sell their coffee 
to whoever they choose. Coffee prices even in the Fair Trade market are 
influenced by the global coffee market and when coffee prices are high, producers 
will often opt to sell in the conventional market instead of their partner. . 
In addition to impacting the social-economic welfare of coffee producers, the collapse of 
the ICA also had an environmental effect. While Fair Trade responded to the socio-
economic repercussions of the collapse of ICA, organic certification was created to 
address the environmental effects. The environmental impact was caused by an 
increasing number of coffee producers who were abandoning traditional production 
methods for modern techniques and particularly “full sun” coffee produced with high 
inputs of  agrochemicals and water (Rice, 1999).  Producers undertook this 
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transformation of their coffee plantations for two reasons one to combat diseases and 
increase productivity as a means of competing in a volatile coffee market (Fridell, 2007). 
The shift in production methods had devastating environmental impacts, which will be 
discussed later in the thesis. It also had the effect of pushing traditional small farmers to 
the margins of coffee production (Westphal, 2008). In order to ensure the continued 
environmental benefits of traditional coffee production a consumer movement developed 
to provide coffee producers a premium for using traditional methods of production. The 
movement coincided with a growing awareness of the environmental harm of modern 
agriculture, which will be discussed below.  
Section 2.7 Introduction to the Organic Agriculture 
The concept or idea for “organic” or “sustainable” agriculture arose as a reaction 
to the modernization and industrialization of agriculture often referred to as the Green 
Revolution. The need for this revolution was driven by the growing demand for more 
food as global populations began rapidly expanding after World War II (Borlaug, 2000). 
The application of these new technologies proved to be a massive success increasing food 
production worldwide. Conventional Agriculture or Modernized Agriculture also 
promoted the homogenization and simplification of crops systems (Borlaug, 2000).  
While these agricultural systems were highly productive, they were vulnerable to 
disease and pests. At the same time these systems, which require homogeneity and 
control had the negative affect of degraded natural resources i.e. soil, water and genetic 
resources. The degradation of these natural resources made these agricultural systems 
highly dependent on synthetic inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides in order to continue 
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(Gliessman, 2007).  Even though conventional agriculture has secured high levels of 
food production using technology, it did so at a great external environmental cost over 
time.  
The organic movement originated as a means of address the environmental threats 
that the Green Revolution (Kuepper, 2015). The movement also incorporated an 
economic component. Promoting the personal responsibility of consumers to support 
organic farmers to protect the environment. As the movement evolved support of 
sustainable agriculture became the premium payment (prices above those of conventional 
crops) that organic farmers receive today.  Farmers received these payments because of 
the opportunity loss from higher productivity they forego by using traditional agricultural 
practices as well as the higher costs of production.  
As organic agriculture became more popular, more farmers joined the organic 
movement because of the premium prices. Buyers were willing to pay these premium 
prices because of environmental and perceived health benefits. Similar to the Fair Trade 
process, as the popularity of organic products continued to grow, and the supply chains 
lengthened, there was a need to institutionalize and standardize the definition of organic 
farming (Kuepper, 2015). International coordination culminated in the formation of the 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movement (IFOAM). Their goal was to 
develop a universal standard of organic practices for farmers. These practices would be 
enforced by “Third party” certifiers and national governments acting as wardens of these 
standards codifying them into law. Europe was an earlier adopter of organic standards 
followed by Japan and the United States. The United States Department of Agriculture 
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(USDA) enforces the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) also commonly referred to 
as the “National Organic Program (NOP).” In Europe, these standards are embodied in 
the Council Regulation (EC) No. 834 and in Japan, they are under the Japanese 
Agricultural Standard (JAS). All these statutory bodies were developed in conjunction 
with the IFOAM, and included the following minimum requirements: 1) The conversion 
of conventional to organic production, 2) Certification and monitoring, 3) 
Documentation, 4) Planting material, 5) Fertilizers, 6) Plant and disease control, 7) 
Livestock, 8) Transportation and handling, 9) Processing, and 10) Labeling. The focus of 
these standards is the exclusion of synthetic inputs as well as the documentation of 
activities and the strict separation of organic products from conventional products and 
inputs (Raynolds, 2004). The organic market continued to expand beyond developed 
countries to include tropical crops from developing countries like coffee.  
Section 2.8 The Organic Coffee Market 
The organic market continued to grow in the U.S. and Europe in 1980-1990s. 
There was also an increasing demand for additional kinds of organic products. However 
coffee, tea and cacao continue to dominate the organic market. In the 1990s, coffee 
producers began to apply for organic certification in order to gain access to the organic 
market that offered higher prices for coffee than the conventional coffee prices. The 
1990s and the early 2000s were a time of low coffee prices given the breakdown of the 
ICA. To get certification, producers were required to meet the same standards found in 
the importing country (i.e., NOP, EC834 and JAP). To meet these standards, producers 
were required to pay third party certifiers to verify their production methods. The 
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payment of the organic premium is variable depending upon the global coffee prices.  
Organic coffee producers typically receive an additional ten percent premium above the 
global coffee price. However, the premium price also depends on a variety of factors 
including the quality of the coffee as well as accompanying certifications, such as Fair 
Trade, amongst others (Pierrot, et al., 2011). 
Since 2001, the organic coffee movement’s share of the global coffee market has 
grown, accounting for 1.4 percent of the total market and totaling 1.6 million bags of 
coffee (60kg/bag) in 2009 (Pierrot et al., 2011). This growth represents a 335 percent 
increase from 2001 to 2009. Latin America is by far the largest producer of organic 
coffee, accounting for 77% of total organic production, with 46% coming from South 
America and 31% coming from Central America (Pierrot et al., 2011). The current price 
premium of organic certified coffee is .30 above the global coffee price for washed 
arabica.  The leading consumers of certified organic coffee are the U.S. and Europe 
accounting for 86% of total consumption (Pierrot et al., 2011). The organic coffee market 
continues to grow at a faster rate than the conventional coffee market. However, in 2010, 
new trends show a slowing in organic production, attributable to slower rates of growth 
in the issuance of organic certifications (Pierrot et al., 2011). Research has tied the 
decrease in the number of certifications issued to the increasingly competitiveness of the 
environmental certification market. New forms of certifications, which also emphasize 
environmental protection and sustainability (i.e., Rainforest Certified, UTZ Certified, 
Bird Friendly Certified, C4 Certified and Demeter Certified), have been developed in 
recent years. These new certification schemes have been criticized for having less 
rigorous standards than those established by IFOAM. The standards established for 
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organic coffee have clearly demonstrated as being more sustainable to agroforestry 
systems (Bray et al., 2002. In addition to greater competition in the certification market, 
organic certification’s declining popularity among producers may be due to that fact that 
premium prices paid to producers is insufficient to meet the additional costs of 
production, as indicated in a growing portion of the literature (Pierrot et al., 2011: Jaffee, 
2007). The issues surrounding the economics of organic certification will be discussed in 
more detail in section 2.11  
Section 2.9 Introduction to Coffee Production, Costs and Environmental Benefits 
Coffee differs from many commodity crops. Coffee is a perennial crop that 
survives many years before needing to be replanted. A coffee plant will typically take 
between four to six years before it will enter production and will remain in production for 
20-30 years. These characteristics necessitate careful planning and significant investment 
in the type of coffee production system a producer chooses to create. The long timescale 
in which coffee production occurs affects the producer and requires significant 
investment on their part, how certification affects long term viability will be elaborated 
on in Section 4.3. There are various production methods available to the producers and 
their decisions have lasting impacts beyond the coffee plantation. Each of these methods 
has varying degrees of both environmental benefit and economic output. The broadest 
categorization of coffee production methods is whether the coffee is sun-grown or shade-
grown coffee. C. robusta grows well in full sun and is well adapted to the tropical flat 
lands. This variety is commonly grown in full sun-condition production method and is 
managed under a “conventional” or “modern” production method. This method is 
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characterized by the use of homogenous crops, the use of large amounts of chemical 
inputs including fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and fungicides. This method also uses 
little shade or eliminates shade all together. Coffee plants in this system are new high 
yielding varieties, which require these chemical inputs to produce. These plants are 
arranged in close proximity to ensure high yield per hectare. This method produces high 
levels of coffee but provides virtually no habitat for biodiversity, unlike traditional shade 
tree coffee.  
The modernization of coffee production was adopted in the 1970s largely due to an 
outbreak of new diseases and pests like Hemileia vastatrix, commonly known as “coffee 
rust,” and the “coffee borer” (Hypothenemus hampei).  This method of production 
involved the removal of shade trees and the application of fertilizers, pesticides and 
herbicides to coffee plantations.  This approach quickly spread among Northern Latin 
American including Mexico, Central America and Colombia (Rice, 1999). By the 1990s, 
approximately half of the land under coffee production in these areas had made the 
transition to “modernization” (Perfecto et al., 1996).  Coffea robusta lent itself 
particularly well to modernization as it was able to tolerate high levels of sun and it 
preferred lower altitude tropical flat lands.   
Shade Grown or Traditional coffee production was often abandoned in this period. 
Today, however, these methods of production are again gaining popularity and once 
abandoned traditional coffee plantations are being brought back into production. (Rice, 
1996). Producers of shade-grown coffee practice various methods of production 
including Rustic, Traditional, and Polyculture, and Monoculture methods of coffee 
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production. Many of these methods utilize various crops, and forest species grown 
together. Traditional production methods have proven to be beneficial to the preservation 
of biodiversity and providing environmental services (Toledo and Moguel, 2012). The 
producers interviewed in this study, and site visits indicated that most Bolivian coffee 
producer use traditional methods of production, which varied from traditional rustic 
systems to Polyculture methods, which will be described in greater detail below. 
The first method of coffee production observed in Bolivia is the “traditional rustic 
system.” It is thought to be the first way of cultivating coffee, dating back to a time when 
the crop was first harvested from the forests of Ethiopia. The main characteristic of this 
system is the preservation of the original forest with coffee planted in the understory, (see 
figure 2). Within this category there are two types of management practices, “forest 
coffee” and “semi-forest coffee.”  Forest coffee is not managed by producers whereas 
semi-forest coffee producers actively manage the understory by pruning understory plants 
and managing the canopy. The management of the understory allows for more light and 
reduces competition for coffee plants (Toledo and Moguel, 2012). The traditional rustic 
method of production was found to be the least efficient in a study of Nicaraguan farms 
(Perfecto et al. 1996). However, this method has been found to have significant 
environmental benefits.  
The second method of coffee production observed in Bolivia involves shade, is 
the “Traditional Polyculture System.”  This method of production is characterized by 
introducing coffee plants to a semi-preserved native forest (see figure 2). In addition to 
coffee, other useful plant species are introduced to provide subsistence or market income 
to
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Moguel, 2012). Coffee also grows in the tropics of the world. These forests are under 
threat from a range of economic pressures, including logging and conversion to 
agricultural lands for conventional and subsistence agriculture (Hosonuma et al., 2012). 
However, agriculture and the preservation of forest like habitats are not necessarily 
contradictory Coffee, because of its cultivation requirements, can provide both 
environmental and economic benefits to society.  The Blackman et al. (2005) study 
showed that in the state of Oaxaca, Mexico, there were reduced rates of deforestation in 
regions where coffee cultivation was present. The study also demonstrated a link between 
the collapse of coffee prices and an increase in deforestation. The authors theorized that 
higher coffee prices, like those found in organic and other certified coffees, could play an 
important role in preserving forests. Traditional coffee growing methods, which often 
align with organic standards, are systems of agriculture known as agroforestry. 
Agroforestry systems, which allow various crops and forest plants to grow in the same 
areas, have been shown to provide many substantial benefits, both environmental and 
economic at a local, regional and global level.  
At the local level, agroforestry can provide a number of benefits both to the 
environment and to the producer. These include pest control, improving pollination, soil 
enrichment, and soil stabilization (Jose, 2009). These are important to farmers of coffee 
because of the steep terrain and poor soils in which coffee is grown. These local 
environmental benefits of traditionally grown coffee also provide economic benefits to 
the farmer. One benefit to farms is that it allows them to continue to produce using 
traditional methods without the investment in modernization. As discussed before, 
modern coffee production uses synthetic inputs to increase productivity, but at the same 
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time causes environmental harm, most obviously to farmers through the degradation of 
soils (Toledo and Moguel, 2012). Case studies of coffee producers in Chiapas, Mexico, 
showed that modern production methods require large amounts of investment from small 
producers, which may actually reduce their real net income (Martinez-Torres, 2008). 
However, in the same case study the use of traditional methods provides a number of 
benefits, such as preventing environmental degradation as well as adding and improving 
the quality of the soil within the production area (Martinez-Torres, 2008). Additionally, 
the benefits result in insect biodiversity, which promotes increased predation of pests as 
well as higher levels of pollination, leading to an increase in yields (Toledo and Moguel, 
2012). 
At a regional level, coffee production has been shown to preserve both the 
biodiversity of a region and water quality within a watershed, especially in the face of 
increasing deforestation. Shade coffee production has been shown to be a vital habitat for 
many species that would be otherwise be displaced by deforestation. Traditional coffee 
plantations are becoming a more integral part of species conservation.  Many of the 
species found in coffee plantations include plants, pollinators, amphibians, migratory 
birds, and bats (Perfecto et al., 1996). Traditional and rustic production methods foster a 
diversity of life providing to displaced species a habitat in which to live and seek out food 
(Perfecto et al., 1996). While most forms of shade coffee production showed some ability 
to preserve biodiversity, the highest levels of biodiversity were found in those traditional 
coffee plantations where organic and sustainable methods were observed. Similarly, 
traditional coffee plantations have been shown to help preserve water quality. These 
benefits are prevalent in areas of steep terrain and deforestation. These factors can 
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increase runoff rates, which can in turn contaminate rivers and impact eco-systems and 
communities downstream (Toledo and Moguel, 2012). 
At the global level, deforestation poses a threat to global climate stability. 
According to estimates from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
deforestation contributes 17.4 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC, 
2007). A study conducted by Soto-Pinto et al. (2009) showed that in comparison to 
pastoral subsistence agriculture, agroforestry systems generated higher levels of biomass, 
a measure of GHG storage. In addition, the study found that among various agroforestry 
systems, organic and traditional coffee cultivation had the highest level of biomass 
creation (Soto-Pinto et al., 2009). This demonstrates the importance that organic and 
traditional coffee production has on carbon sequestration, especially given the global 
increases of deforestation. Vast areas of the tropics (approximately 11 million hectares 
worldwide) are dedicated to coffee production (Toledo and Moguel, 2012). The sheer 
magnitude of coffee production has an important role to play in controlling the outcome 
of the global climate.  
Section 2.11 Issues with Organic Coffee 
Part of the attraction to organic coffee production is the reduced need for external 
inputs. For example, modern agrochemical inputs represent a higher cost of production 
especially for small producers who cannot scale their operations. Studies have shown that 
what organic producers give up in lower yields they may make up for in the low costs of 
production. These lower production costs provide additional savings in that producers 
avoid borrowing money (Toledo and Moguel, 2012). However, these studies fail to take 
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into account the administrative cost of certification and the changing production cost 
associated with organic production. These costs are largely fixed. International certifiers 
conduct these certifications and they are often paid at rates similar to their home countries 
(Jaffee, 2007). In addition to the cost of certification, these standards are constructed in 
the northern countries as described above which do not take into account the different 
environmental and cultural conditions that coffee producers face in the global south 
(Jaffee, 2007) (Raynolds, 2004). These studies also do not take into account the shifting 
costs of production. Labor is a significant cost in growing and processing coffee (Jaffee, 
2007; Martinez-Torrez, 2008, Bray et al., 2002). Organic coffee production uses 
extensive labor to manage the agroforests in which coffee is grown. The increase in the 
cost of labor reduces the benefit of the organic premium (Bacon et al., 2008; Jaffee, 
2007). Furthermore, many farmers have seen an increase in “organic inputs,” which are 
methods of control and fertilization that are approved for use in organic farms. The drive 
for many farmers to increase their use of these inputs is largely the result of increasing 
rates of pest and disease, specifically “ coffee rust,” a type of fungal disease devastating 
shade grown coffees (Bacon, 2008). In summary, the challenges faced by farmers who 
utilize organic production include higher labor costs, high cost of certification, and 
dealing with the high costs of mitigating diseases and pests, all of which reduce the 
premium price meant to cover the cost of organic production; this ultimately makes 
participation in organic certification less economically beneficial for producers.  
Having discussed the forces that shape the global coffee market including price, 
quality and method of production, the costs associated with certifications and the 
challenges of financing, as well as the role that organic and Fair Trade certifications play 
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on the outcomes of producers, we now concentrate on the area of study for this research. 
Bolivia is a unique country in Latin America given its large indigenous population, its 
status as the second poorest country in the Americas. Most importantly, Bolivia has been 
shaped by the immense cultural, economic, and political importance of coca.  
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Chapter III - Methodology 
This Chapter will outline the area of study, its unique history, and the economic and 
political forces that shaped the region. It will also outline the current economic and 
ecological characteristics of the region. This chapter will then go on to outline the 
analytical basis for the methods adapted to this research.  Lastly, this chapter will outline 
the methods used to collect data from stakeholders, how stakeholders were selected for 
this study and the method of data analysis. 
 
Figure 3 Map of the study area 
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Section 3.1 Delineation of Study Area   
 
Bolivia is a landlocked country in South America (see figure 3).  With its diverse 
terrain, the country has a wealth of ecological tropical and temperate zones capable of 
growing various crops.  Bolivia’s diversity is also reflected in its people who are from 
various indigenous groups, but principally Quechuas and the Aymaras. It is the only 
majority indigenous country in Latin America.  Despite its diversity, Bolivia is the 
second poorest country in South America. Forty-five percent of Bolivians live on less 
than $2 dollars a day (World Bank, 2015). The majority of the Bolivian Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) is derived from the export of minerals and energy, which is approximately 
38.5%. Agriculture makes up only nine percent of their GDP. Nevertheless, the 
agricultural sector is the country’s largest employer and employs approximately 32% of 
Bolivians (World Bank, 2015). In terms of volume, Bolivia’s major agricultural crops 
include soybeans, cotton, sugar and quinoa. Conversely, in terms of revenue quinoa, 
coffee, and coca are the most valuable crops produced in Bolivia (MDRyT, 2011). 
The area of study for this research is in the Department of La Paz, focused 
specifically on the Sud Yungas region. Within Sud Yungas is the Province of Caranavi 
(see figure 3). This province is home to the majority of the country’s coffee production 
that represents approximately 85% of the total production, with an area of 25,834 ha., 
with an annual coffee production of 9,345,417 kg of coffee per year (MDRyT, 2011). 
According to FAO estimates, this represents 1.3 percent of Bolivian agricultural 
production in terms of dollar value. (FAOSTAT, 2013) Nor Yungas and Sud Yungas 
regions have always been areas of coca production. Because of the prevalence of coca in 
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the regions history, the Yungas region has been shaped largely by the economic and 
politics of coca. This occurred in the days of the early Bolivian republic through to the 
alternative development programs funded by UNDCP and USAID, which established the 
coffee industry.  
Section 3.2 The Ecology of the Bolivian Yungas  
Yungas lies at the eastern base of the Andes. It is part of a larger ecoregion 
stretching from Peru along the Andes to Argentina. The Yungas ecosystem is 
characterized as a tropical and subtropical humid forest, which includes mountainous 
cloud forests and various kinds of evergreen forests (Brooks, 2009). The moisture for this 
region comes from the northern trade winds, which carry humid air from the Atlantic that 
condenses when it meets the Andes. The altitudes of the ecosystems are between 400 and 
3500 meters above sea level. The region is known for its mountainous terrain and its deep 
valleys and rivers. The ecosystem is a buffer between the low-lying Amazonian 
ecosystem to the East and the high altitude Puma habitat to the West (Brooks, 2009).     
Within the Yungas region there are 35 endemic and restricted range species, 
meaning that these species are either found nowhere else on earth or that their breeding 
habitats are only found in this eco-region.  Examples of endemic species include the 
diademed tapaculo (Scytalopus schulenbergi) and the near threatened green-capped 
tanager (Tangara meyerdeschauenseei). Another endemic species, the southern helmeted 
curassow (Pauxi unicornis) is found to have viable populations in the Bolivian Yungas, 
which is an important finding given the bird’ status as critically endangered.  While the 
majority of endemic species in the Yungas regions are birds and plants, there are 
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mammals like the Brocket Deer, (Mazama chunyi), which also call this region home. In 
addition to mountain species, other wide-ranging, lowland species also dwell in Yungas 
include Neotropical mammals like the tapir (Tapirus terrestris) and jaguar (Panthera 
onca). While the Yungas is known for its humid forest, species from arid regions 
buffering the Yungas have made their habitat in this ecoregion. Migrant species include 
spectacled bear (Tremarctos ornatus) a vulnerable species, Geoffroy’s cat (Felis 
geoffroyi) and pacarana (Dinomys branickii) (Brooks, 2009).  There are a number of 
relatively large protected areas, including Madidi National Park, Carrasco National Park, 
Isiboror Sécure National Park, the Amboro National Park, and Bellavista Protection 
Forest Reserve, all together encompassing just over 60,000 square kilometers.  Despite 
the large area protected by parks and reserves, this ecoregion is threatened by 
deforestation because of human migration to the region continues to increase (Brooks, 
2009). Farmers tend to burn the forest as a way of managing it for cash crops. In some 
cases, crops and logging have increased because of road-building in the region designed 
to provide immigrants access to once isolated lands. Extensive deforestation in the 
foothills of the Bolivian Andean region for crop cultivation now endangers over 70 
species of birds (Brooks, 2009).  
Section 3.3 History of Coca and Bolivia  
Compared to other Latin American nations, coffee’s entrance into Bolivia was 
relatively recent. While most countries in the region began producing coffee in the late 
19th century, Bolivia began its coffee industry in the mid 20th century. While Bolivia’s 
market was just budding, the global industry began to face many of its greatest 
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challenges. Coffee production in Yungas cannot be fully understood outside of the broad 
historical, social, political and economic forces that are at play in the region. Before the 
introduction of coffee, agriculture in Yungas had been dominated by the production of 
coca. Coca (Erythroxylum coca) is a plant whose leaves are prized for its psychoactive 
alkaloids most widely known because of cocaine (Leons and Sanabria, 1997). Coca is 
considered a sacred plant by the Aymara and Quechua people. The custom of chewing 
coca leaves with lye, known as mascar or akullicu, is still practiced in Bolivia today. For 
workers, Mascando is seen as a time to socializing, a practice similar to an American 
coffee break (Leons and Sanabria, 1997).  
Coca became Bolivia’s leading agricultural crop in the post-colonial era. Like 
many industries at that time, the management and production of coca was heavily 
controlled by Bolivia’s elites. Yungas became the major center of production for coca. 
The production of coca was organized on large estates (haciendas) owned by the elite 
landowners. The hacienda owners organized themselves into the Society of Landowners 
of Yungas and Inquisivi (SPY) in the 1830s to market coca and invest in regional 
infrastructure (Sanabria, 1993).  
As the abuse of cocaine and other narcotics plagued Europe and the U.S. in the 
early 20th century, there was an increasing global demand to criminalize these substances. 
In 1919, during the meeting of the Second Opium Convention, coca and cocaine were 
targeted for criminalization by the international community. The SPY sensed a potential 
threat to their economic dominance and therefore, began to use its economic and political 
influence to oppose the regulation of coca. They influenced the Bolivian government and 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prevent the country from becoming a signatory to 
international agreements on narcotics. The influence of SPY is clearly illustrated between 
1920 and 1950 (Lima, 1997). During that time, the Bolivian government allowed for the 
continued use and production coca despite international pressure to cease production 
(Lima, 1997).  
In 1952, SPY's influence within the Bolivian government disappeared when the 
national government was overthrown by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolutionario 
(MNR), a center-left political movement. The MNR was Bolivia’s first national coalition 
government and it was widely popular among indigenous people. The MNR’s goal was to 
upend Bolivia’s political elite, and to promote political and economic reforms. The new 
government was established to reclaim economic and political enfranchisements of 
indigenous peoples. Among the MNR’s primary goals was to institute a comprehensive 
agrarian reform (Sanabria, 1993). These reforms were legislated in 1953 when the 
national government passed agrarian reform through Decreto Ley 3464 or La Reforma 
Agraria en Bolivia. The MNR's reforms dismantled the hacienda system of coca 
production, and it redistributed land to the peasant farmers. After the reform, small 
landholders who produce coca (cocaleros) gained control over coca production, which is 
how it remains organized (Sanabria, 1993). 
While the destruction of SPY meant more economic opportunities for small landholders, 
it also meant that there was no organized political group to ensure coca production 
remained legal (Leons and Sanabria, 1997). In 1961, the Bolivian government signed 
onto the Single Convention on Narcotics. For the first time the Bolivian government 
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agreed to the eradication of coca as a strategy to control cocaine production. At the same 
time, coca production was spreading beyond its traditional home in Yungas to Chapare, 
another region of Bolivia. In order to combat the growing production of coca, the 
Bolivian government signed bilateral agreements with the U.S. in the early 1970s under 
authoritarian President Hugo Banzer. These agreements provided funding for eradication 
of coca as well as alternative development projects that were meant to encourage farmers 
to transition to crops other than coca (Leons and Sanabria, 1997). 
Throughout the 1970-1980s, a line of successive military juntas and weak civilian 
governments ruled over Bolivia. The mismanagement of the national economy by these 
governments and juntas left the economy in shambles with little means of raising 
revenue. At the same time, demand for cocaine and coca had exploded. Following the 
removal of Hugo Banzer in 1978, the government became desperate for revenue and 
began capitalizing on the sales of coca and coca paste, which partially funded the 
Bolivian government. The practice of coca capitalization culminated under General Luis 
García Meza who openly associated with drug lords. He also established new agencies 
(Acopio de Coca) to organize the harvesting of coca throughout the country. Under his 
rule, coca farmers were forced to sell all their coca to the government at set prices, which 
were extremely low (Leons, 1997). During this period the U.S. limited or suspended aid 
to the Bolivia. Suspended aid included aid programs to promote the alternative 
development of coffee as an alternative to coca.  The lack of aid impacted the nascent 
coffee industry.  
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The exploitative policies of General García Meza brought about his deposition in 
1982. However, the open production of coca and coca paste by cocaleros did not end. In 
1985, the Asociación Departamental de Productores de Coca (ADEPCOCA) was formed 
in Sud Yungas. The main goals of ADEPCOCA were to organize these cocaleros and 
counter the recent decline in coca prices by promoting the development of alternative 
uses for coca in products like toothpaste and coca liquors (Leons, 1997).  In 1988, the 
Bolivian government also signed onto the Convention Against Illegal Trade in Narcotics 
through Ley 1008. The new law provided traditional coca growing areas like Yungas and 
Inquisivi permission to grow coca. The new agreement did not permit coca’s eradication 
through spraying, but it did authorize the government to undertake military operations to 
destroy coca paste production. The new law also included requirements that the U.S. and 
Europe provide significant funding for alternative development programs.  
Yungas was no longer the main region of coca production.  The Chapare had long 
surpassed Yungas as the major coca producing area in Bolivia. This area was the focus of 
the eradication efforts. The eradication of coca plants and destruction of coca paste had 
had the effect of raising coca prices in the 1990s (Leons, 1997).  The use of increasingly 
harsh tactics by police and military forces in Chapare resulted in protest and resistance to 
the government’s control efforts. Protests throughout Chapare and La Paz called for 
reforms to the ley 1008. In 2004, the government changed the law to specify that each 
family would be allowed to grow one cato or 1,600 square meters in which to produce 
coca in Yungas.  The movement for greater liberalization of coca production culminated 
in the 2006, when coca grower President Evo Morales came to power in Bolivia. Under 
his administration eradication programs were reduced and authorize the one cato per 
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family rule in Chapare. His government also continues to provide funding and investment 
in the development of alternative uses for coca (Farthing and Kohl 2010).  While his 
government is not working to eradicate coca, it has continued to regulate and prevent the 
trafficking of coca for narcotic purposes. The push back from the U.S.’s traditional goals 
of eradication and control has cause a rift in U.S.-Bolivian relations. This culmination 
being in 2013 when USAID was asked to leave the country after fifty-two years (USAID, 
2013). USAID has been one of the coffee industries biggest supporters and had provided 
significant financial and marketing assistance to the country’s growers.  
Section 3.4 History of Coffee and International Development in Yungas 
Coffee had always been part of the agricultural crops of Yungas. Along with coca and 
citrus, coffee was one of Yungas major crops since the early 20th century.  Coffee, 
however, had not been the main focus of the region. It was not until the mid-1950s that 
coffee production began to reach industrial levels.  This growth in the coffee industry 
coincided with the agricultural reforms and improved transportation between Yungas and 
La Paz. Despite this initial coffee boom, Bolivia failed to reach its quotas under ICA.  It 
was largely under the promotion of alternative development programs that coffee 
production expanded significantly in Yungas and shaped the coffee market that exists 
today.  
Beginning in the early 1960s, like many Latin American countries, Bolivia was a 
recipient of large amounts of international aid (USAID Bolivia, 2013). However, much of 
the financial and developmental assistance Bolivia received was tied to a single issue 
within the country, the eradication of coca.  A large portion of the aid Bolivia received 
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from the 1970s -1980s was solely focused on the control and elimination of coca, with 
forced eradication being the primary means of control (Sanabria, 1993). However, 
beginning in 1981 there was a growing demand within Bolivia to provide economic relief 
to those losing their coca fields. Later on in the decade, Bolivia reasserted the validity of 
traditional uses of coca. Concurrent with the national assertion, the international 
community began to recognize the importance of traditional coca and began to move 
away from the idea of complete eradication; new emphasis would be placed on the 
control of what was deemed “excess coca” instead, the coca that went beyond meeting 
the local demand for traditional uses.  International institutions and development 
professionals agreed that “excess coca” should be curtailed through a combination of 
economic incentives and alternative crops, rather than forced eradication. The strategy 
became known as “Alternative Development” and would be the centerpiece of 
development in coca growing areas from 1981-2010.  
In Bolivia, two organizations lead the alternative development strategy: USAID and the 
United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNIDCP). Both organizations 
established programs to provide large amounts of funding for infrastructure projects, 
community development, financing, marketing, and technical assistance to alternative 
crops. The focus of these organizations was to control the growth of “excess coca” in 
Chapare, a region valley in the Department of Cochabamba. The area had seen an 
explosion of coca production in the 1970-80s, almost all of which was destined for 
cocaine production.  Notwithstanding, there was a growing amount of “excess coca” also 
being produced in its traditional area of cultivation, Yungas.  While the bulk of USAID 
and UNIDCP funding was focused on Chapare, both organizations made provisions for 
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smaller programs to control excess coca in Yungas as well. The UNIDCP first established 
the Agroyungas program and later USAID established the Yungas Development Initiative 
(YDI).  
The UNIDCP Agroyungas program began in 1981 with the goal of promoting coffee as 
substitute or alternative crop to coca. Coffee had been chosen for this project, because of 
UNIDCP’s prior success with alternative development in Thailand, substituting coffee for 
poppies (Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1993). In the ten-year life of the 
program, 1981-1991, approximately 2,000 ha of coffee were planted in the Yungas 
valley.  Despite the growth of the coffee industry, very little coffee actually substituted 
coca in previously farmed land; coffee-coca replacements amounted to an estimated total 
of 104 ha (Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1993). An explanation to the 
limited replacement of coca cultivation may be that the majority of the coca grown in the 
Yungas region is used for traditional purposes (e.g. tea, chewing, etc.) and the reversion 
of coca growing in Yungas to legal status under Bolivian law 1008 in 1988. 
 According to U.N. assessments, the project had a number of problems including a lack of 
understanding by those offering technical assistance to adapt methods to local terrain, 
climate and participants. The coffee Agroyungas had attempted to introduce new high 
yielding varieties from Colombia and Brazil.  They were meant to replace the older 
varieties, however, these new varieties were breed to be managed under modern coffee 
cultivation methods with limited sun and a high degree of chemical inputs. Many farmers 
were unwilling to invest in the modern techniques, because of the high costs of 
production or their concerns regarding erosion (Leons, 1997).  Adding to the tensions 
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between farmers and technical advisors was the advisors’ demand that farmers plant in 
the dry season, leading to high plant mortality in many of these newly planted cafetales. 
All these factors resulted in a lack of productivity in the initial coffee crops.  
Compounding on this failure was the global decline of coffee prices following the 
collapse of the ICA.  This collapse coupled with the failures in productivity meant many 
farmers were worse off than before they shifted to coffee.  Making the situation worse 
was that farmers had used their lands as collateral for loans to make this transition-loans 
sponsored by UNIDCP (Leons, 1997). In order to collect on the debts, the Bolivian 
government was forced to take these farmers’ land. Given the major flaw in the program, 
the UNIDCP forgave the loans in order to save the farmers from foreclosure on their land 
(Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1993).  
The period following the end of Agroyungas was a tumultuous period for coffee 
producers in Yungas. The 1990s was a period of low coffee prices. Like many coffee 
markets, producers in Bolivia look to alternative markets as a means of gaining high 
prices to cover their cost of production. In the 1990s cooperatives were formed, which 
allowed producers to access the organic and Fair Trade markets. While these new 
markets provided higher prices, many of the structural and reputational problems of 
Bolivian coffee continued to exist.  It was not until the following decade, with renewed 
efforts from USAID and other European development agencies, that these were 
addressed.  
Following the closure of the Agroyungas program in the 1990s, USAID as well as other 
European organizations made development resources available through the Bolivian 
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government and non-governmental organizations. Again, mostly focused on the Chapare 
region with some funding for Yungas (ACDI/VOCA, 2008). These resources included 
financing for farmers who wanted to substitute coca for other crops. However, the 
majority of the funds went to a number of local projects including building the capacity 
of local government, electrification, road and infrastructure projects, as well as funding 
law enforcement to monitor illegal coca trafficking. It was not until 2001 that the 
majority of focus on alternative development switched from Chapare to Yungas. It was 
then USAID made greater contributions specifically to coffee as an alternative to coca in 
the region through the development of the USAID Market Access and Poverty 
Alleviation (MAPA) (ACDI/VOCA, 2008). This objective of the program was to 
improve the quality of coffee produced in the region, which had suffered under a bad 
reputation.  Farmers were given technical assistance, and funding was provided to coffee 
cooperatives to pre-process (prebeneficio) coffee berries before being transported to La 
Paz for final processing (Monsen, 2003). In addition to investment in infrastructure, 
USAID also helped to market Bolivian coffee for its quality with the Cup of Excellence 
competition. The Cup of Excellence is an international competition sponsored by 
USAID, which funds coffee experts to come to USAID’s partner countries to assess the 
quality of their coffee. The competition showcased Bolivian coffee as being of high 
quality and allowed it to cast off its former reputation. The Cup of Excellence was among 
the last alternative development programs supported by USAID before President Evo 
Morales expelled the organization from Bolivia in 2013.  The coffee industry continues to 
produce in Yungas. However, the lack of government and international support brings 
 51
new challenges to the coffee producers of this region. Outlining the challenges as well as 
addressing possible means of undertaking reforms is the focus of this research. 
Section 3.5 The People of Yungas 
Because of its difficult terrain the Yungas region of Bolivia has long been isolated from 
the rest of the country. The roads leading to Yungas were little more than loosely packed 
stone and dirt paths suited for mules, some of which harkened back to the Inca Empire 
(Sanabria, 1993). The SPY, through its taxes on coca, was able to finance the 
construction of an automotive road in 1935, the labor of which was prison labor from the 
Chaco War (Sanabria, 1993). However, the valley of the Yungas continued to remain 
sparsely populated until after the Agricultural Reform Law of 1953, which provided 
indigenous Bolivians the right to land ownership (Sanabria, 1993). It was not until then 
that the low lands of Yungas and Chapare began to be filled with the Aymara and 
Quechua farmers of the Altiplano. These new farmers soon realized that their traditional 
crops (i.e., potatoes) and cultivation methods were ill-suited to the new tropical forests in 
which they now found themselves. Several of these farmers began to produce coca, 
citrus, and coffee like the already established farmers in the area. Many were just learning 
about these new crops when the government and international interest, began investing in 
alternative crops to coca.  
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Section 3.6 Analytical Framework 
World systems analysis researchers state that nations are not good units of analysis 
because it is a whole system of trade which is developing not simply national societies. 
(Talbot, 2004)  However, it is difficult to understand the global trade system because it is 
composed of so many players industries and institutions. A way of understanding the 
whole trade system is breaking it down into manageable units not by country but instead 
by product.  Each product of the global economy has a set group of production, 
processes, and economic transactions these are referred to as a commodity chain  (Talbot 
2004). Each commodity change has various stages in which production and processes add 
value to a given product, identifying the countries where these stages occur is an 
important aspect of analyzing global commodity chains (GCC).  
Traditional GCC analysis divides a commodity chain to three types of stages. The 
periphery is where the simplest and least profitable processes are done. The intermediary 
stage is where combinations of simple and more complex processes are carried out, and 
finally, the core stage where the most complex and valuable processes occur (Gereffi, 
1999). The fact that these different stages occur within specific nation states allows the 
state to regulate and influence these processes to a limited extent (Talbot, 2004). The 
limits of the states power to influence a specific commodity chain are the result of it 
being linked to a global system of trade, which ultimately is governed by those who 
control the commodity chain. In much of the literature regarding CCG analysis the 
control of commodity chains rest with transnational corporations (TNC) (Gereffi, 1999). 
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 Gereffi (1999) divides most commodity chains into two types of governance structures. 
The producer-driven commodity chain which usually involves products, where capital 
and technology are intensive inputs. The second is buyer-driven that are labor-intensive 
industries most commonly consumer goods.  Coffee falls into this second category of 
commodity chain. The coffee commodity chain like many producer driven chains is 
characterized by TNC, which does not produce products directly but uses global sourcing 
and marketing to control their commodity chain.  Gibbon added to CCG analysis by 
identifying a subcategory of buyer-driven chains; the “trader-driven commodity chain.” 
His analysis identified the unique role of international trader TNCs in commodity 
markets.  
Each commodity chain is then divided into three dimensions 1) the input output structure, 
2) a geographic and organization distribution of production 3) and a governance 
structure.  CCG analysis looks at the structure of these chains and how transaction takes 
place along them. Talbot asks the fundamental question  “who benefits where is value 
being added to a product and who is appropriating the profit.”  In the coffee commodity 
chain, we know that international traders are a critical intermediary in the conventional 
coffee market. International roasters however, play an even bigger role in their ability to 
shape the commodity chain because of their unique position to derive rents from product 
identity, producer differentiation and product innovation (Gary, 1999). 
In the conventional market, producers and consumers are disassociated because 
intermediaries have such a greater role in the delivery of commodities. Narrowing this 
separation is the growing awareness of consumers regarding the environmental impact of 
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their purchases as well as the unfair profits that producers receive.  Hence, organic and 
Fair Trade certifications strive to eliminate intermediaries in order to reconnect 
consumers to producers, allowing them to reflect their moral values through their 
purchases. One way of evaluating the effectiveness of such connection is to analyze the 
commodity chain by which they are connected. A commodity or value chain is “a set of 
organizational network clustered around one commodity or product linking households, 
enterprises and state to the one another within the global economy (Taylor et al., 2005, 
p130)”. Raynolds, (2002) outlines a structure for the analysis of organic and Fair Trade 
utilizing a commodity that follows a network approach. The network approach combines 
various methods of study including traditional commodity chain analysis and political 
economy. The method of analysis is focused on “how individuals and collective social 
actors ideologically and materially construct, maintain and transforming commodity 
network” (Raynolds, 2002, p. 404). The analysis of this framework compares: “(1) The 
traditional commercialization and industrial convention rooted in price competition, 
bureaucratic efficiency, producer standardization, and formal certification, and (2) 
alternative domestic and civic conventions rooted in trust and equality, global, social, and 
environmental responsibility, collective effort, and societal wide benefits (Raynolds, 
2002 p .408).”  
Traditional Commodity Analysis investigates the interconnected process of raw material 
production, processing/packaging shipping, marketing and consumption embodied in a 
given commodity. Within this method of analysis there are varying approaches each 
emphasizing different facets of production. For example commodity systems analysis 
focuses on labor organizations and relations, while commodity chain analysis focuses on 
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world-wide temporal and spatial relations (Friedland, 1984). Beyond these methods 
Filiere analysis focuses on national political regulation and instructions (Lauret, 1983).  A 
Raynolds’ method builds upon many of these methods taking into account both the 
economic and the social goals of alternative trade. Many of the benefits that alternative 
trade are meant to promote and are based on their ability to shorten commodity chains 
(i.e., remove intermediaries), to instill the ideas of equality and trust, and their ability to 
challenge traditional business models (Raynolds, 2002).  
While Raynolds’ method of analysis attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis, critics 
claim her method of analysis is overly static. Raynolds counters that her approach can 
incorporate various methods of study including cultural, action-networks and 
conventional approaches.  The advantage of her approach seems to lie in being able to 
consider two key characteristics of these alternative trade markets. The first being that 
these markets are “buyer driven” meaning that distributors are able to control both the 
supply system and productions specification. The second characteristic as Raynolds’ 
identifies is that unlike conventional commodities where price and quantity are the main 
drivers, in alternative markets quality is a factor, which affects the tension between 
institutions.  Specifically this method addresses how quality can be exercised as a new 
kind of power and source of tension between institutions in a commodity chain.  
In order to implement Raynolds’ commodity network approach data must be collected 
from all institutions along the commodity chain. To understand how institutions interact, 
how tensions form and exist between organizations and how tensions and asymmetrical 
relationship affect the benefits meant to producers, data about how stakeholders perceive 
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one another must be collected.  The number of stakeholders is largely dependent on the 
size of the market and the success of alternative trade in removing intermediaries. 
Because Bolivia has a high participation rate among producers in alternative trade, there 
is a limited number of stakeholders in the commodity chain.  For this reason, I selected a 
small number of key stakeholders that represented this shortened commodity chain for 
the purpose of focused interviews. Additionally, the limited time and resources available 
for this research allowed only a small number of producers to be interviewed for this 
study, justifying the purposive sampling used. However, the small number of producers 
should not impact the results of this study since, the main goal was to gain a broader 
narrative of production and market mechanisms rather than the specific estimates of 
producer economic benefits. Further, the study is focused on the inter-relationships 
between organizations in the commodity chain and how the inter-relationships impact the 
benefits of alternative trade form the perspective of the producer.  
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3.7 Sampling, Stakeholders, and Survey Methods 
Sampling Methods - a purposive sampling method was used to make a comprehensive 
collection of key stakeholders along the supply chain of coffee in Bolivia (Bernard,  
2011).  This included the following organizations: 
Key Stakeholders  
Government: In-depth interviews were conducted with the two ministries that administer 
coffee in Bolivia, the Vice Ministry of Coca and Rural Development (VCDI) and the 
National Fund for Alternative Development (FONODAL). 
National Coffee Organizations: Interviews with the leaders of the two national coffee 
organizations Federación de Caficultores Exportadores de Bolivia FECAFEB and 
ANPROCA Asociación Nacional de Productores de Café were interviewed. 
Cooperatives: Five of the country’s biggest cooperative leaders were interviewed for this 
study as well as one cooperative leader from a much smaller cooperative. 
Producer: Fifteen coffee producers from six cooperatives, which participate in organic 
and Fair Trade production, were interviewed for this research.  Due to the distance 
between farming communities and the often difficult or impassible terrain, a respondent 
driven sampling was used to locate coffee producers. These surveys were conducted in 
person.  The majority of the interviews were held in Caranavi, the center of the coffee 
producing community. Surveys were also administered on site visits to the cooperative 
meeting houses during workshops or cooperative working days.  These producers own 
relatively small plots of lands, usually smaller than five ha.  
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Certifiers: Two organic certifiers and one Fair Trade certifier were interviewed. Both 
organic certifiers were from BioLatina and IMO Control International based on their 
focus on coffee. Interviews were also conducted with representatives of FLO 
International that was in Bolivia at the time of the research. 
Quality Testers: Two interviews were conducted with the only coffee quality certifiers 
(catadores) of Bolivia. This organization, Café Calidad, is one of the oldest institutions 
dedicated to coffee in the country. 
Buyers: One Fair Trade buyer’s staff was interviewed.  The organization has had a 
continual presence in Bolivia. 
Excluded Population:  Not included in the study where private buyers commonly referred 
to as rescatistas. These members refused to participate in the survey.  Individual coffee 
producers were also unable to participate in the survey due to their isolation. 
A number of semi-structured survey questions were developed in order to assess the 
Bolivian coffee market. Each survey was designed to collect unique qualitative and 
quantitative information of the various participants along the supply chain. These surveys 
were developed to collect descriptive information from key informants and producers. 
The questions used in the semi-structured surveys were developed using the literature 
review. The literature helped to identify common issues and problems within the 
commodity chain and capture whether these problems or similar ones were also occurring 
in the Bolivian coffee market. Each survey included informational questions assessing the 
role, size, and scope of the participant within the commodity chain.  Many of the 
questions were similar across surveys to tease out themes across participants. A brief 
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description of each survey is included below.  Each group was asked about the same 
questions in order to triangulate varying opinions as a means of understanding issues and 
conflicts between stakeholders. 
Section 3.8 Data Collection Method 
Government Officials and National Coffee Leaders:  Semi-structured interviews with 
these individual consisted of a set of general questions attempting to outline the general 
coffee market as well as issues between institutions.  These stakeholders were also asked 
to provide examples of their support for coffee growers, their opinion of the industry, the 
national goals, and how they related to coffee production. 
Producers: This semi structured survey included questions about perceptions of 
institutions in the supply chain, including certifiers, cooperatives, and national 
organization as well as local support programs. These questions used a Likert scale to 
evaluate the overall sentiment about cooperatives and certifiers (Bernard, 2011).  
Producer surveys also include limited qualitative data regarding the perceived welfare of 
the household, and quantitative data regarding the percent of income generated from 
coffee production and coffee not sold to cooperatives. Producers were asked how 
cooperatives, certifiers, and private aggregators could improve their programs. 
Cooperative leaders and staff:  The survey included questions about perceptions of 
certifiers, and national government programs, and included both open and closed 
questions. It included a Likert scale regarding their approval of certifiers and national 
government programs (Bernard, 2011).  Cooperative leaders were also asked about the 
participation of their members, their commitment to the cooperative, and their ability to 
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work with international buyers. They were also asked about ways they would improve 
relationships between certifiers and buyers. 
Certifiers: This semi structured survey was conducted to collected information about the 
size and scope of the organic and Fair Trade coffee market in Bolivia; certifiers were 
asked about their practices of reviewing cooperatives for certification,  the survey also 
collected data about violations and how these violations were resolved.   
Fair Trade Buyers: This semi-structured survey was administered to collect information 
about these institutions’ ability to support cooperative and their members.  These buyers 
were asked about the ability of cooperatives to meet their obligations. Questions also 
covered topics about compliance with the certification process, how they felt about the 
requirements and the ways felt they thought the process could be bettered.  
In addition to data collected using surveys. Secondary Data was also collected  through a  
review of  locally available literature on Bolivian coffee production. Sources included 
government reports, NGO studies, and university research. Also included in the analysis 
are the observations of the researcher while in the study area. 
Section 3.9 Method of Analysis 
Data collected from questions in interviews and surveys were then analyzed. Discourse 
analysis was used in the evaluation of the responses (Bernard, 2011). The discourse 
analysis method was chosen because it requires the researcher to carefully identify 
common themes within the population surveyed. Because the study seeks to understand 
how various groups interact along a supply chain, it was important to identify common 
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themes (i.e., issues among the participants as well as their perceptions of one another) 
Themes were identified using text analysis software, which provided a basis for the 
researcher. These informed deeper analysis within themes as well as proposed solutions. 
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Chapter IV - Results and Discussion  
Section 4.1 Stakeholder Analysis  
 
Producers - There are approximately 17,491 coffee producers in Bolivia (with a total 
area of 36,105 ha), of those 15,925 are found in the Province of La Paz (34,816 ha) 
(MDRyT, 2011).  In La Paz, 81.9 percent of the producers are organized in cooperatives 
or associations (MDRyT, 2011). These producers own relatively small plots of lands, 
usually smaller than five ha. Regarding their role, 15 producers were surveyed for the 
study. Producers described their production method as being traditional production 
similar to the traditional polyculture described in Toledo and Moguel (2011). In addition, 
site visits confirmed that the majority of coffee growers grew coffee under a mix of 
existing shade cover of forests and citrus trees. The use of Traditional Polyculture was 
further confirmed by the Bolivian Coffee Census (MyDRT, 2011), which described shade 
as permanent, and the spacing of coffee trees as being generally two meters apart. 
Though all sample producers mentioned that diseases were a growing problem, they 
remained certified organic.  In a government survey of producers less than three percent 
used chemicals (MDRyT, 2011).  Producers are responsible for removing the coffee 
seeds from the berry, wash the beans and bring them to cooperative houses for drying. In 
some cases, they will dry the beans before they go to the cooperative.  
The sample of producers had an average of land area of 9.5 ha per household. However, 
producers seldom used all their land for coffee production. Among the producers 
surveyed approximately half of their land (5.2 ha) was used for coffee production. The 
remaining land was most often undeveloped, or dedicated to some combination of 
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subsistence and coca production.  The variety of crops grown by producers is 
representative of the diversified income streams producers have available to them. While 
most of the producers depended on coffee for a significant portion of their income on 
average 79 percent of their income from coffee, no producers was dependent solely on 
coffee. Coca was by far the second most important crop generating 12 percent of the 
producer’s income. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of coffee producers in the study area (N =15) 
Characteristics Unit Amount 
Sample mean land holding ha/household 9.5 
Mean land area dedicated to coffee ha/household 5.2 
Average coffee yield lb./ha 434.2 
Household characteristics 
 
         Coffee 
         Coca 
         Other  
 
 
% 
 
% 
 
 
            79 
 
12 
9 
Household Characteristics 
 
         Age 
         Household size 
         Education more than primary 
 
 
Year 
 
% 
 
            41.7 
 
5.5 
40 
Producers with 
         TV 
         Cell 
         Car 
         Computer 
         Own house 
          
 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
 
87 
100 
60 
40 
87 
Opinion of 
         Cooperative 
         FLO/Org 
 
Average 
satisfaction level on 
a Likert Scale of  
1-10 
 
7.5 
7.8 
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Cooperatives: There are 35 coffee cooperatives in Bolivia under the umbrella 
organization of FECAFEB. Twenty-five of these organizations are in the department of 
La Paz, representing nearly all of the coffee exports, except those undertaken by 
ANPROCA.  The cooperatives are in charge of aggregating their members’ coffee beans, 
and drying and transporting the same to the city of El Alto for processing. Most of the 
cooperatives have their own coffee plant (beneficio) where they will hull coffee beans 
(pergamino) as well as select the coffee on the basis of characteristics set up by the 
buyer. The selection process is done by hand in Bolivia and represents the most 
significant cost of processing. The cooperative then transports the beans to Arica, 
Bolivia’s free port in Chile. Cooperatives handle most of the administrative functions of 
coffee exports, including dealing with the buyers, working with the certifiers, and 
coordinating transportation, processing, and distribution of payments to members. 
Table 2. Characteristic of samples cooperatives 
Organization Members 
Coffee Land 
Ha.(FLO/Org)
Annual Volume (FLO/Org) 
Approx. Kg 
Antofagasta 308 280 108,000
ASOCAFE 76 167 126,000
Trebole  50 70 27,000
Illiampu 75 250 108,000
Union ProAgro 192 700 450,000
Villa Oriente 129 540 288,000
 
Total 830 2007 11,07,000
Percent of Total 9.22 0.08 11.85
Source Authors Data and MDRyT, 2011 
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National Coffee Organization: Two national organizations claim to represent coffee 
producers at the national level. The first of these was (ANPROCA), which was 
established in 1980s. The ANPROCA claims to represent all coffee producers in Bolivia, 
focusing on individual producers that are not part of a cooperative. The ANPROCA was 
among the first organizations to offer beneficio processing to coffee cooperatives and 
holds export licenses to sell coffee abroad. The FECAFEB was started in 1991, and it 
represents all organized coffee workers. The FECAFEB was originally started for the 
purpose of acting as an exporting agent for coffee, and for a time held fair trade 
certification for a number of cooperatives. Currently, its work has expanded from 
focusing on acting as an exporting agent for those who do not have a license to 
organizing coffee producers and providing technical and financial assistance, which are 
now done by European organizations.  
The Bolivian coffee market is unique for a number of reasons: its competition with coca, 
its relative infancy, and its lack of coordination at the national level either from the 
industry or within the government.  The Bolivian coffee industry is represented by two 
national organizations Asociación Nacional de Productores de Café ANPROCA and 
Federación de Caficultores Exportadores de Bolivia FECAFEB. Both of these 
organizations claim to speak on behalf of all producers. ANPROCA has a larger number 
of members because it is composed of all independent coffee producers across the 
country, including those “passive producers” who collect coffee from rustic coffee 
plantations.  FECAFEB only represents coffee producers who are members of a 
cooperative. These members are generally more active in the production process. As a 
result, these producers grow the majority of the country’s coffee. Because these groups 
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represent different kinds of coffee producers with different interests, conflict exists about 
which of these organizations truly speaks for the industry. While the origin of the conflict 
depends on the perspective of the person, the effects of the conflict are clear.  The 
government uses these disagreements as justification for inaction towards supporting 
coffee, although these organizations have come together to propose plans and submit 
petitions to the government. The government contends that the conflict is grounds for 
inaction. 
Certifiers: There are three certifiers that work with coffee producers in Bolivia: 
BioLatina and IMO Control for organic certification, and FLO-CERT for Fair Trade.  
IMO Control is the largest of these organizations and has offices around the world with 
its headquarters in Germany.  IMO Control certifies approximately 35 percent of 
cooperatives. BioLatina certifies the remaining 65 percent with its headquarters in El 
Salvador. The FLO-CERT has its own office in Bolivia, and certifies all Fair Trade 
cooperatives in Bolivia. Approximately 16 cooperatives are FLO certified, this numbers 
shift, because sometimes cooperatives merge or dissolve. One representative from each 
certifier was interviewed for this study.  These organizations felt that producers were 
actively participating in the certification process and that many had become well 
informed as to the norms. They stated that the majority of producers followed the norms 
without violations and that incidents were penalties had to be put in place were a rare 
occurrence. Certifiers also commented that when corrective measures were called for 
producers were able to comply, during the following certification.  
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Government: The Bolivian government supports coffee programs through a number of 
agencies within the Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural y Tierras (MDRyT); sub-agencies 
include the Viceministerio de Coca y Desarrollo Alternative (VCDA), the Viceministerio 
Desarrollo Rural y Agropecuario (VDRA), and Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo 
Alternativo (FONODAL). The VDRA appropriates funds to rural development 
throughout the country, including popular programs like Projecto de Alianza Rurales 
(PAR), which provide assistance to small farmers throughout the country.  Under the 
VCDA the government provides some financing to FINCAFE, which provides small 
loans to coffee producers.  Lastly, FONODAL is a fund administered by the Bolivian 
government on behalf of European development agencies with the aim of reducing excess 
coca.  One minister from the VCDA was interviewed, and one minister from FONODAL 
was interviewed. Both Government official were asked about their goals for the coffee 
industry in Yungas. The government position was that coffee was a fairly well developed 
industry and that the government had limited role to play. When asked about specific 
programs working on coffee production, government official cited general programs to 
help rural farmers in the study area.   When asked about why there is no specific plan for 
coffee farmers. Government officials said that conflict between coffee groups was a 
major cause for the lack of action.   
National and International Buyers: National buyers include two groups: domestic 
roasters for internal consumption, and Bolivian exporters. These organizations use 
intermediaries known as rescatistas in Bolivia to buy coffee directly from producers at 
prices below those offered in the certified coffee markets. Conversely, Fair Trade buyers 
assist producers’ organizations by providing technical assistance and financial assistant as 
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part of their partnership. No rescatistas were willing to be interviewed for this research 
and only one international buyer was in the country at the time of this research.  
Section 4.2 Commodity Chain in Bolivia 
Unlike many other Latin American coffee producing countries with a long tradition of 
coffee production, together with coordinated and centralized markets under Institutos de 
Café, there is no single central authoritative agency within the Bolivian government.   
There is a lack of consistent tracking of data regarding the industry’s production and 
quality of coffee, as well as a lack of monitoring of consumption patterns in importing 
countries. Moreover, the institutos of major coffee producers usually charge fees in order 
to re-invest in the coffee industry. These organizations typically use their funds to fund 
lobbying organizations to promote government investment; they also provide technical 
and financial assistance to coffee growers. These organizations will also manage national 
coffee markets by restricting exports or setting quality standards. Such an organizational 
model does not exist in Bolivia. Instead, in Bolivia, there are five major commodity 
chains also referred to as market channels by which coffee flows for exporting or for 
domestic consumption. These commodity chains are expounded on below. The marketing 
channels described below were developed from the semi-structured survey administered 
to organizations in the commodity chain.  Specifically, this analysis comes from 
questions dealing with the intermediary role and scope in the market.  
Chain One: Traditional Cooperative Chain 
Coffee producers that are part of a cooperative will sell directly to buyers abroad. The 
cooperatives collect coffee from its members, followed by transporting, processing, and 
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exporting it on their behalf, and take responsibility for distributing the profits back to its 
members. Normally there will be a membership fee and costs discounted from the sale. 
The process can be lengthy as payment and distribution takes a longer time. Nevertheless, 
given that only cooperatives can hold organic and fair trade certification, members are 
guaranteed higher prices that are set above global coffee price for conventional coffee . 
Having access to these markets and controlling the processing of their coffee allows 
producers to reduce the number of intermediaries between them and the buyer allowing 
them to have more power over pricing and to preserve profits for coffee producers.  
Chain Two: Boutique Chain 
If a coffee producer is known for producing extremely high quality coffee, their beans 
can be referred to as boutique coffee. These producers can choose to sell to the buyers 
abroad that are willing to pay very high prices, between $7 to $11 USD per pound. These 
prices are above what even organic and fair trade buyers are willing to pay. Boutique 
producers, depending on the cooperative’s rules, can do one of two things: 
A) If they are members of a cooperative that allows them to export without aggregating 
with other members, the producer may elect to use the cooperative’s facilities and 
transportation infrastructure to export their specialty coffee. The cooperative can either 
charge the producer on the basis of the size of their sale or not charge them, because as 
members they are entitled to transportation and processing as part of their membership 
dues. 
B) If their cooperative prohibits members from exporting coffee that is not aggregated 
with the rest of the cooperative, producers seeking to sell to boutique buyers must find an 
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intermediary or other cooperative to export their coffee. Using these intermediaries will 
often cost the producer more than aggregating with their own cooperative, but the 
boutique coffee price is attractive enough that they are willing to pay these additional 
costs. While this commodity chain is not direct, the use of community-based cooperatives 
provides for a level of protection from the exploitative pricing of TNC and coffee traders 
who could take advantage of producers. These producers also tend to sell to small 
boutique roasters, which actively are willing to pay high prices for top quality beans 
sourced from small producers.  
Chain Three: Small Individual Growers or Small Cooperatives 
Small cooperatives or individual producers of coffee will use a FECAFEB or ANPROCA 
to export coffee. Because they lack resources to participate independently these 
organizations will use national associations to processing, transport, certify, and export 
their coffee.  The national associations generate revenue by charging fees to process. 
However the fees do not cover the full cost of processing. These national organizations 
will also receive funding from European aid agencies in exchange for promoting coffee 
as and alternative crop to coca.  The ANPROCA is the national organization of coffee 
producers, whether organized or not, and will export coffee on their behalf.  The 
FECAFE is the national organization for organized coffee producers. More often they 
will export on behalf of cooperatives that are small and lack the capacity to process their 
coffee or the export licenses needed to do so. The route is similar to the traditional route 
only differing in that the national association facilitates exports. In addition to holding 
export licenses, these organizations can obtain certifications on behalf of small 
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cooperatives. Working with these national associations small and independent producers 
have access to the premium prices organic and Fair trade certification provide. The 
ANPROCA currently holds Fair Trade certification for small cooperatives individual 
producers. The FECAFE held this certification until recently; FLO-CERT decertified the 
organization, because of a lack of transparency. The national organization as part of the 
certification processes forces its members to undergo the same evaluation as cooperative 
members.  The certifiers will visit small cooperative as they would larger cooperative or 
visit communities of small producers. These inspections are held annually. This is an 
example of how commodity chains can be shortened to the benefit of producers. While 
this chain is not as short as a traditional cooperative chain, it does not provide greater 
access to the producer to high prices and more stable buyers. This provides a degree of 
production from the volatility and exploitative prices in the conventional market.  
Chain Four: “Rescatistas” or Private Aggregators  
Often coffee producers will need funds immediately. In these cases, coffee producers will 
sell their coffee to an intermediary known locally as a rescatista, a coffee rescuer.  While 
the term is friendly sounding in Bolivia, these are more commonly known as coyotes in 
the rest of Latin America (Raynolds, 2002). This type of coffee buyer will take advantage 
of the coffee producer’s need for liquid capital and will pay below the market price for 
coffee. These types of buyers are either located in towns near coffee producing regions or 
will venture into coffee regions in search of coffee.  Even cooperative members will sell 
to these rescatistas in times of need or when prices are high. Some producers claim to 
sell only coffee they know is low quality to these agents. Coffee collected by the 
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rescatistas will often be consumed locally, however, it has been known to also make its 
way to the international market; depending on the coffee’s quality.  The syphoning of 
coffee from the alternative market demonstrates that TNC and coffee traders retain their 
influence in Bolivia despite the high levels of participation. Having these intermediaries 
in the coffee market reduces the benefit of alternative trade to all producers and allows 
for the exploitation of producers  
A summary of these commodity chains are outlined in the figure 4 below. Although 
precise numbers are difficult to estimate the diagram shows the direction and size of each 
chain in the context of Bolivia. It shows that the majority of the coffee comes from 
producers associated with cooperatives members and is certified both as organic and Fair 
Trade via cooperatives.  Also present in the market are independent coffee growers. 
Ideally these coffee growers should have their coffee purchased and certified by 
ANPROCA which would then export to internationally buyers at Fair Trade prices. 
However, as shown in figure 4, rescatistas are buying a major share of coffee from 
independent producers. Rescatistas will then sell to domestic coffee roaster and to 
international traders. An application of commodity chain analysis show that even with the 
reduce influence of traditional TNC in the Bolivian market given the high levels of 
participation in organic and Fair Trade markets. Recatistas still hold sway over individual 
producers.  Their influence is due to the failures of the organic and Fair Trade market to 
provide sufficient support for producers. These short-comings will be asses in the 
subsequent section. 
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Flow Chart of Commodity Chains 
 
Figure 5 Commodity Chains of coffee in Bolivia 
Section 4.3 Evaluation of Organic and Fair Trade Incentives 
Bolivia’s coffee market has had some success in improving the lives of its producers; this 
can be attributed largely to their ability to remove many of the intermediaries from their 
coffee value chain. Cooperative leaders credit greater profitability thanks to reducing 
intermediaries and working closely with dedicated international buyers. However, it is 
not clear that these benefits extend fully to producers affiliated with cooperatives or 
national organizations. The continued presence of rescatistas and their ability to buy 
coffee from cooperative members is symptomatic of administrative and structural issues 
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within the organic and Fair Trade marketing process. The presence of these 
intermediaries in an otherwise largely short commodity chains allows these actors to take 
advantage of producers and undermine the advances that organic and Fair Trade 
certification movements have brought to Bolivia. The reason this chain exists stems from 
the issues faced by participants within the organic and Fair Trade markets. Many of these 
issues are due to a failure in the incentives structure meant to address the exploitation of 
producers due to trade liberalization.  Some examples include: the shortcoming of plus 
pricing, the limited nature of financing, and how participants choose to respond to 
economic pressures of certification.  These issues will be discussed at length below. 
Plus Pricing for Organic and Fair Trade 
Plus pricing or premium pricing is meant to provide and add social benefit in the Fair 
Trade market. This same pricing scheme is meant to cover the producer’s additional 
expenses from organic production. However, many of the producers and cooperative 
leaders surveyed for the present study stated that the premium they received was not 
sufficient.  Principally, those surveyed complained about organic premium prices. The 
premium, currently set at $ 0.30 for C. arabica, is meant to cover the additional costs of 
production associated with organic methods.  The additional costs of production not only 
affect the producer, but are also carried at the cooperative level.  Many producers 
surveyed stated that their incomes have been declining despite, recent increase in coffee 
prices.  As an explanation, they pointed to increased rates of diseases, and rising costs of 
production. The majority of the producers surveyed cited the rising cost of labor as the 
main factor in increased expenditures.  The cost is embodied in the harvest and weeding 
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of coffee, which can occur up to twice a year.  Even producers with large families stated 
that hiring labor was necessary for production. All producers stated that the annual 
harvest was their largest expense.  The second largest cost was the weeding and removal 
of shade, the primary means of managing coffee plantations.  These additional costs can 
be attributed to Fair Trade requirements of fairly paid laborers and the rising cost of labor 
in the region. Many producers and leaders commented that many laborers also were 
harvesting other crops, which increases demand for labor.  Producers may also be 
expected to house and feed workers during harvest and if the worker is migrating from La 
Paz, transportation may also be included.   At the cooperative level, leaders stated that the 
costs of certification and accompanying administrative expenses were a major cost that 
reduced the benefits of the organic premium. The cost of certification depends on the size 
of the cooperative, but the average cost of certification was approximately U.S. $3,000 
dollars for organic certification per year (Yucra, 2012). Of the survey cooperatives, only 
one provided information regarding the Fair Trade certification, which was $2,000 per 
year.  The FLO-CERT states that their pricing depends on the size of the cooperative and 
the grade (adherence to FLO standards) of the organization and the processing which 
occurs (FLO-CERT, 2015). 
Producers mentioned that the Fair Trade premium price and the price floor offered by 
Fair Trade were the biggest incentives for their involvement in cooperatives. However 
producers also mentioned that the minimum price barely covered the costs of production. 
The producers indicated once again the increasing costs of labor as the biggest 
contributor to the decline in the effectiveness of Fair Trade’s price floor. At the 
cooperative level, labor was equally mentioned as a major cost, referring this time to the 
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labor required for the selection of coffee beans. Selection is the process by which inferior 
beans are removed from the final product.   Processing is required as part of Fair Trade 
quality standards.  In Bolivia, selection is done by hand and is extremely labor intensive. 
Contributing to the instability felt by producers because of labor concerns is the 
variability in global coffee prices.  Coffee prices have fluctuated since the introduction 
and implementation of organic and Fair Trade certification in Bolivia. Steep decline in 
prices between 2010 - 2013, accompanied by a rise in the labor costs made it difficult for 
many produces to generate a profit in Bolivia (see figure 5).  Adding to their hardship is 
the fact that many Bolivian coffee producers compete for labor with coca producers, as 
seen in the graph below. Over the same period of time, coca has enjoyed relatively stable 
increases in prices? while coffee has periods of both steep and long decline (see figure 5). 
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Producers cited financing as a very important and attractive element for encouraging their 
participation in Fair Trade. 
The aforementioned economic struggles are the reasoning behind Fair Trade’s 
requirements of mandatory financing.  Fair Trade Buyers usually make small loans to 
producers. These loans typically come in the form of anticipos, which are made to 
producers depending on their expected harvest. In the present study, the majority of 
producers said they received sixty percent of their expected harvest as an anticipos at the 
beginning of the year.  These small loans helped producers finance their cost of living 
and production until the harvest. Despite the benefits of annual financing, some producers 
spend the anticipos before their second payment is paid, because of unforeseen expenses 
or poor planning.  In these cases, producers will often sell coffee to rescatistas who work 
for international coffee traders who sell coffee into the conventional coffee market where 
TNC dominate market decisions. These buyers are usually located in Caranavi and will 
buy coffee immediately, paying producers at or below global coffee prices. When asked 
about this occurrence, producers typically said that they would sell between 1-3 percent 
of their crop to rescatistas, citing that it was coffee the cooperative would not take, 
because of its poor quality. 
Amongst the producers interviewed, all had received some kind of financing from their 
participation in Fair Trade.  The majority of these producers received the anticipo that 
charges the producer an interest rate between 7 percent and 9 percent.  Producers 
commented that this interest rate added costs to their participation in Fair Trade. Of the 
15 producers surveyed, only two mentioned they had received what they called a prepago 
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or pre-payment. This pre-payment was made to producers at the beginning of the year, 
based on 60 percent of their expected harvest, yet differed from an anticipo in that it did 
not charge an interest rate to the farmer. The two producers that mentioned this form of 
financing remarked how it had lowered their costs and had helped them to invest in 
production. Therefore, as explained, producers have financing available to them; 
however, both the anticipo and the prepago are meant only as short-term investments 
means to cover the cost of production and household production. Coffee demands long-
term financing, owing to the length of time it takes to reach its production age and the 
high costs associated with developing a plantation. In Bolivia, because of the high costs 
of loans, small farmers are excluded from the financial system.  
Long-Term Financing 
Cooperative leaders, producers, certifiers, and buyers mentioned that declining 
production of coffee in Bolivia is a major problem facing the industry.  Nearly all of them 
indicated that the aging of coffee plants in existing coffee plantations drove a decline in 
production, and that renovation was key to reversing the current trend.  All the 
respondents also stated that renovation was a costly investment for producers and that 
there are very limited means of funding this process.  The FINCAFE, a government 
supported credit agency, provides loans at an interest rate between 12 percent and 18 
percent. When producers were asked about using FINCAFE’s loans, they stated the loans 
were difficult to apply for, expensive, and a high financial risk.  Another problem with 
FINCAFE’s loans is that they are not always used to increase coffee production. 
Cooperative leaders as well as buyer claim that producers will often use FINCAFE’s 
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loans to buy cars or trucks to become taxi or truck service providers between La Paz and 
Caranavi. These activities reduce coffee production as producers spend less time tending 
to their land.  
Similarly, cooperatives struggle to find financing for reducing the cost of processing. 
Cooperative leaders indicated that their biggest cost aside from annual certification is the 
operation of the beneficio (coffee processing plant). Many cooperative leaders, especially 
of larger cooperatives, mentioned that the cost of selecting coffee was the largest expense 
in operating the beneficio. The three largest cooperative leaders surveyed expressed 
interest in investing in new technology that would mechanically select beans as a means 
to reduce the high cost of labor associated with this processing. These machines can cost 
up to $1 million USD, representing a significant investment for these small organizations. 
Bearing in mind that the largest cooperative surveyed, Cooperative E, had a total revenue 
of $1.2 million USD in 2013, this technology remains well out of reach to Bolivian 
cooperatives (see table 2). Finding financing for these large investments would need to 
come from the government or international development sources. Financing has been 
difficult to find even for the biggest cooperatives, because of the political climate in 
Bolivia and USAID’s removal from the country in 2013. 
Section 4.4 Issues of Conduct and Performance in the Bolivian Commodity Chain 
Fair Trade depends on a partnership between producers and buyers, but it also affects all 
those involved in coffee production.  Regardless of the social aspect of Fair Trade, there 
is still an element of competition as in any marketplace. Consequently, issues regarding 
the conduct of participants in their respective roles impact others along the supply chain. 
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The section below will present the conflicts erupting between sets of participants so as to 
better grasp the complexity of the supply chain. 
Tensions between Producers and Cooperatives 
Unlike, typical coffee markets where coffee producers are unable to sell their entire crop 
to the organic and Fair Trade, Bolivian producers, are able to sell all their crop to these 
markets. As members of cooperatives participating in Fair Trade, producers are supposed 
to submit all their coffee to the cooperative in order to fulfill their contracts with buyers.  
This ensures the largest volume of sales and therefore the greatest social premiums are 
paid to the community. However, according to cooperative leaders, producers aggregate 
only some of their coffee. When cooperative leaders where asked how much coffee was 
not being aggregated, they estimated that somewhere between 3-10 percent of a 
producer’s harvest was captured by a rescatista.  This threatens the cooperative’s capital 
for the management of the beneficio, whose expenses are largely fixed and include the 
maintenance of the equipment and property.  Declining harvest yields coupled with 
private coffee sales by producers translates into declining economies of scale for the 
cooperative because of which the cost of processing gets spread over a smaller quantity 
of coffee. Cooperative leaders and buyers indicated that the amount of coffee escaping 
the Fair Trade/Organic market was dependent on the global “c-price”. If the “c-price” is 
low, coffee producers will deliver more of their coffee to the cooperative. Conversely, if 
coffee prices are high, producers were less likely to deliver their entire coffee crop 
capitalizing in the expedient profit provided by the rescatistas. All producers surveyed 
stated that the delay in the final payment of the Fair Trade/Organic market was a key 
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factor in their frustration with the cooperative and played a role in their sale of coffee to 
rescatistas. This delay of payment is a financial problem within the cooperative.  
According to buyers and cooperative leaders, a coffee buyer will usually take between 3-
4 weeks to pay for the coffee after it has left the country.  The payment can then take 3-4 
months before it is distributed by the cooperative. Some producers said this precedent of 
delay had in turn compelled them to sell their coffee outside the cooperative.  The 
postponement of payment represents an administrative deficiency in the cooperative.  
This may be attributed to the limited education of the majority of producers and 
cooperative leaders, many of whom only have an elementary or middle school education. 
Despite, issues with the timing of payments producers on average had a high opinion of 
the cooperatives (7.8 on a Likert scale from 1 to 10) (see table 1).  
Tensions between Cooperatives and Buyers  
Addressing the declining coffee production and issues with producers delivering their 
entire coffee crop, cooperatives in Bolivia are having difficulty filling orders from 
organic and Fair Trade buyers, especially in years when “coffee” are high.  The inability 
to fill orders causes tension between buyer and cooperatives it means producers must 
look elsewhere for coffee. Organic and Fair Trade producers have invested heavily in 
promoting economic development in these communities, increasingly they find 
themselves promoting long-term development of the coffee industry. . 
Tensions between Organic Certifiers and Producers in the commodity chain 
While organic and Fair Trade markets are built on the principle of providing an economic 
benefit to producer who practice both socially and environmentally responsible 
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production, these system still possesses asymmetries in power which favor buyers.  
Organic certification requires rigorous production methods and Fair Trade buyer will 
often tack on quality standards in addition to Fair Trade requirements.  In the case of 
Bolivia there have been a number of issues between organic certifiers and specific 
participants surveyed. These tensions arise because they are onside and do not provide for 
producers to challenge the certifiers finding and require cooperative to pay for 
certification. These issues differed from other case studies in Mexico, where whole 
cooperatives suffered from penalties and decertification (Jaffee, 2007).  Certifiers in 
Bolivia use penalties against specific members instead of the whole cooperative.   In 
Bolivia, for the most part, penalties and corrective measures were issued to individual 
producers. Normally a key issue between cooperatives and certifiers was the penalty of 
temporary decertification. Decertification meant a loss of premium until the producer 
undertook corrective measures. These penalties depending on the violation can include 
wait periods of up to three years.  Being excluded from premium prices severely affects 
the producer’s income and does not impact the buyer. Producers cited this as a major 
concern for them.  The asymmetry of power present in the certification is systematic of 
problems with the alternative.  Fortunately, producer noted that decertification was a rare 
occurrence. The majority of producers maintained a positive opinion of certifiers (7.8 on 
the Likert scale) (see table 1).  Both surveyed certifiers felt that the majority of producers 
did understand and followed the organic standards. They commented that a major point 
of contention is the control of diseases and pests for which they hold various workshops 
and trainings to educate producers. 
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Bolivia’s challenge of low coffee production is because of a variety of factors, including 
old coffee plants and the threat of diseases, especially ojo de gallo (Mycena citricolor) 
and coffee rust. Many producers had commented that climate change was a major factor 
in the increase of diseases because of higher than usual rainfall in the region. In order to 
boost production, some producers have used disease control methods that violate organic 
norms and standards. One main point of contention was the use of burning as a control 
method. Producers argue this is a traditional method that does not violate organic 
standards, however, certifiers contend that burning can consume soil and threaten 
biodiversity. Despite issues of contention, the majority of producers felt that certifiers 
provided sufficient training to understand the organic standards. They also felt that the 
organic standards as well as the procedure of documenting their activities were easy to 
comply with once they familiarized themselves with the practice. However, with high 
turn over among cooperative leaders, many cooperative still struggle to meet all the 
requirements.    
Section 4.5 Industry and National Politics and their Impact on Coffee 
The contentious issues between participants along the supply chain, and their perceptions 
of one another, provide insights about: 1) how the organizations involved can be 
improved, 2) where issues of misconduct can be addressed from both sides, and 3) where 
additional support is needed. Institutions that were notably missing from the discussion 
above were the Bolivian government and the national political organizations. An industry 
does not exist in a vacuum; national policies and priorities have an impact as can be 
illustrated in the context of Bolivia. 
 86
The Bolivian coffee market is unique for a number of reasons: its competition with coca, 
its relative infancy, and its lack of coordination at the national level either from the 
industry or within the government.  The Bolivian coffee industry is represented by two 
national organizations ANPROCA and FECAFEB. Both of these organizations claim to 
speak on behalf of all producers. ANPROCA has a larger number of members because it 
composed of all independent coffee producers across the country, including those 
“passive producers” who collect coffee from rustic coffee plantations.  FECAFEB only 
represents coffee producers who are members of a cooperative. These members are 
generally more active in the production process. As a result, these producers grow the 
majority of the country’s coffee. Because these groups represent different kinds of coffee 
producers with different interests, conflict exists about which of these organizations truly 
speaks for the industry group. While the origin of the conflict depends on the perspective 
of the person, the effects of the conflict are clear.  The government uses these 
disagreements as justification for inaction towards supporting coffee, although these 
organizations have come together to propose plans and submit petitions to the 
government. The government contends that the conflict is grounds for inaction. 
Bolivia’s government’s inaction, however, may be tied to broader national and 
international goals of the current president. Since the election of President Evo Morales 
(“Evo”) and his party, Movimiento al Socialismo, in 2006, the country’s policies have 
taken a more active role in the economy. The empowerment of indigenous groups and 
socialist policies meant to redistribute the country’s wealth are at the forefront of 
President Morales’ work. Among the most important national policies of the Morales 
Administration is the Food Sovereignty of Bolivia. In 2009, Bolivia changed its 
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constitution to include specific language promoting food sovereignty as an issue of 
national importance. Subsequent laws have created programs to promote domestic food 
production and promote the development of agricultural industries throughout the 
country, with a focus on domestic consumption (Claeys, 2015).   In the eyes of Evo 
Morales greater food sovereignty is linked to expansion of coca production.  Before 
ascending to the presidency, Evo Morales had been a cocalero (Farthing and Kohl, 2014), 
and there has been an expansion of the coca industry under his administration. More land, 
up to 50,000 ha can now be legally cultivated for coca. The government has invested 
heavily in new processing and industrial plants for legal uses of coca, such as teas and 
liqueurs. The policing of excess coca have also changed under his leadership, seeing a 
shift from an active police role to an active role of local unions to limit “excess coca”. 
These measures have failed to control excess coca production as seizures of cocaine 
within Bolivia continues to increase during Evo’s presidency (Farthing and Kohl, 2014).  
As part of the country’s food sovereignty goal, the government is also creating programs 
to increase Bolivia’s domestic coffee production capacity. In interviews with government 
ministers, new plans to increase coffee production were outlined. Unfortunately, these 
plans were not focused on Yungas or any of the export-oriented coffee growing regions 
of the country.  According to these ministers at VCDR and FONODAL, new projects for 
coffee are being developed to meet domestic coffee demands. According to the 
government official and observed by the researcher the majority of Bolivians consume 
instant coffee made from C. robusta and not from the export quality C. arabica beans 
grown in Yungas.  Given the lack of internal production of C. robusta, the majority of 
coffee Bolivians consumed is imported. The government consequently is planning to 
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foster C. robusta cultivation in Beni, a flat area that lies east of Yungas, at the edge of the 
Bolivian Amazon. These plantations will then provide coffee for a government proposed 
processing plant, which will make instant coffee meant to meet domestic needs. 
The shift towards greater domestic food consumption and expansion of the coca industry 
is reflected in the opinions of all those surveyed and interviewed. All participants felt 
strongly that the national government was neglectful, and that the government should do 
more to support the industry. They advocated for investment in financing, the renovation 
of coffee plantations, and research stations that would increase productivity through 
organic pest and disease control. Many mentioned a need for an agency within the 
Bolivian agriculture ministry (MDRyT) to coordinate coffee production in the country, 
like those found in Colombia and Costa Rica (Fridell, 2007). 
Furthermore, the government’s move towards Anti-Americanism has cost the Bolivian 
coffee industry one of its greatest supporter, USAID. President Morales removed USAID 
from Bolivia in 2013. Evo’s decision was largely due to his perception of U.S. policies as 
being imperialist (i.e. coca eradication), and his closer alliances with other socialist 
leaders in Latin America, including former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and 
Cuban President Raul Castro. The producers sampled in the present study praised USAID 
and its key role in the development of the industry, as well as the importance of the “Cup 
of Excellence” competition in bringing global attention to the quality of Bolivian coffee. 
The competition has created demand for Bolivian coffee, outside the organic and Fair 
Trade market, and opened the boutique coffee market. This market offers the ultra-
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premiums for high quality coffee beans. However, its purchase remained limited to a 
small number of select buyers.  
All participants stated that the return of USAID would be welcomed and that their 
programs had benefited the coffee industry. The lack of support from the government and 
the removal of USAID, according to many stakeholders, is a major factor in the declining 
production of coffee in Yungas. Participants also cited the growing importance and 
production of coca as a contributing factor to rising cost of labor. Cooperative leaders 
also commented that, because of rising coca prices, many coffee producers were less 
committed to coffee production, contributing to an overall decline. 
Bolivia faces many of the same challenges as other Latin American countries 
participating in organic and Fair Trade production; among the challenges are those 
forming along supply chains. These challenges arise primarily from the limited types of 
support producers receive. Like many coffee producers throughout Latin America, 
Bolivian producers complain that the benefits of the price premium and price floors are 
not sufficient to meet the growing challenges they face (Bacon et al., 2008; Mendez et al., 
2010, Valkila and Nygren, 2010). 
These challenges lead to a breakdown in the institution that are meant to protect coffee 
producers from the abuses of the market.  Fair Trade, through its financing requirements, 
is meant to allow producers to make decisions based on their long-term interest instead of 
short-term hardships. However, stagnate premiums, low price floors, and financing tied 
to interest rates, forces producers to resort to survivalist tactics, including the decision to 
sell coffee to rescatistas.  While only a small portion of coffee is being syphoned from 
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the alternative market the low productivity and high processing costs makes the actions 
of the rescatistas all the more damaging.  Bolivia faces a unique challenge, the long-term 
decline in production runs contrary to the experience of global producers. Generally, 
certified producers in other countries struggle to sell the entirety of their coffee crop to 
organic and Fair Trade buyers given their large quantities (Mendez et al., 2010). 
Conversely, in Bolivia, producers, cooperative leaders, coffee buyers and certifiers cited 
declining coffee production as a major concern. The escape of coffee to the conventional 
market has impacts along the production chain.  
Coffee being syphoned off to the conventional market undermines the benefits of organic 
and Fair Trade participation in that is raises the costs of production. Premiums for coffee 
have not been raised since 2011 while at the same time the cost of production continues 
to rise (Fair Trade USA, 2011). Production costs continue to rise because of the rising 
cost of labor and the greater need to control pest and diseases.  Adding to these 
production costs are the cost of certifications and the cost of meeting the quality 
standards set by buyers.  In Bolivia’s case these costs may be higher than in other 
countries (i.e., Colombia) because of the absence of technology needed to select coffee 
beans. Adding to the pressures of rescatistas is the influence organic and Fair Trade 
buyers who raises the costs of production.  These cost are not exhibited thought price 
negotiations but though quality demands. Like in Raynolds (2003) study, Bolivian 
producers are forced to meet quality standards set by buyers. Meeting these standards 
increases the cost of production and further diminishes the benefits of organic and Fair 
Trade participation for producers. 
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Section 4.6 - Unforeseen motivation 
Given all the difficulties that these producers face and the declining state of the industry, 
it is reasonable to ask why producers continue to invest in coffee.  Almost all the 
cooperative leaders and producers that participated in this study highlighted the dedicated 
buyers they worked with as part of Fair Trade as the reason for their production. These 
buyers have not only provided financial stability to these cooperatives by purchasing 
increasing amounts of coffee, but also provided tremendous technical support.  One 
major Fair Trade buyer has dedicated staff in Bolivia, which provides technical support, 
materials, as well as assists cooperative leaders with administrative tasks. The staff is 
made up of local Bolivians that live in the community and know all the farmers.  One 
buyer Lobodis has even taken their support a step further removing their branding as the 
primary means of marketing their coffee. Instead marketing under the name of the 
producing cooperatives. This is a sign of the dedication these buyer have to Bolivian 
producers and the level of power they are willing to give up to ensure the success of the 
cooperative and the local producers.  
Another factor that encourages coffee growers to continue their production and overcome 
the issues they face along the supply chain is their method of production. Taking into 
account that the majority of coffee producers in Bolivia practice Traditional Polyculture 
as their method of production, which comprises subsistence crops as well as cash crops 
(i.e. citrus and coca), their income is drawn from a variety of sources. According to 
participants in the study, coca and citrus on average account for 10-20 percent of a coffee 
grower’s income, with coca normally accounting for ten percent.  Diversified income 
streams have shown to provide greater stability for coffee producers, even those involved 
 92
in Fair Trade production (Bacon et al., 2008) (Jaffee, 2007). Therefore, the diversification 
of agricultural products could assist Bolivian producers in weathering the difficulties of 
the coffee markets.  This is best seen through coca and citrus crops, both of which have 
processing facilities in communities close to Caranavi, and receive government support. 
The positive practices of organic coffee production have spillover effects on the 
production methods used in other crops. In Bolivia, organic practices are being applied to 
citrus, and other crops grown in proximity to coffee, more importantly these standards are 
also being applied to coca.  Organic production counteracts the growing trend amongst 
coca producers, which have adopted synthetic inputs and have abandoned traditional 
terracing, thus contributing to soil erosion and pollution. This shift is best observed in 
how coffee growers in Yungas are working with the national government, Asociación de 
Organizaciones de Productores Ecológicos de Bolivia (AOPEB), and BioLatina to 
develop an organic certification standard for coca in addition to coffee. The certification 
will reward coffee growers who also produce coca for following traditional production 
methods that conform to the IFOAM model. In addition, the certification will allow 
coffee producers who also grow coca to inform consumers in Bolivia that the coca 
products they grow preserve the environment. 
Beyond monetary motivation, Bolivian producers expressed a great deal of pride in being 
the producers of high quality coffee, which is increasingly known worldwide. All sample 
participants were proud of being part of the global coffee market that recognizes Bolivian 
coffee as a quality crop.  Moreover, participants were very pleased to have overcome the 
international stigma towards Bolivian coffee once known for its poor quality.  In 
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summary, despite all the challenges the industry faces the coffee industry in Bolivia 
continues to exist thanks to the diversified incomes of producers, the dedication of 
international buyers and their support, as well as the past investment by USAID and 
others, which helped Bolivia’s coffee gain a global reputation for high quality. 
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Chapter V - Recommendations and Conclusion 
Like many other coffee producers in Latin America, Bolivian coffee growers have sought 
to protect themselves from the volatility of the international coffee market by entering 
into the Fair Trade/Organic market. Nonetheless, these certifications are limited in their 
ability to perfectly shield producers from the fluxes of the market. Within the certification 
realm, there remain issues dealing with external cost of participation as well as 
institutional problems, which weaken the supply chain.   
Section 5.1 Addressing issues in the supply chain 
To address these weaknesses, countries throughout Latin American have developed 
safety nets and subsidies for coffee producers to ensure that the benefits of organic and 
Fair Trade markets accrue to producers. In this section, solutions from other countries 
will be applied to the weaknesses in the supply chain noted in the context of Bolivia. 
Moreover, original policy recommendations will be made based on the current and 
unique situations in Bolivia. 
Price Floor and Premiums: It would appear simple to fix the issues of the supply chain 
by simply increasing premium prices and the price floor for organic and Fair Trade 
certification or creating a recurring evaluation tied to inflation. The proposed solution is 
nevertheless limited, because the amount of coffee purchased is still at the discretion of 
the buyer Fair and Organic makers still hold much of the power and control of organic 
markets, as did TNC in the conventional market. This further demonstrated by, Blundell 
(1998), and Mendez et al. (2010) which identified new emerging certifications, may be 
preferable to buyers because of their less stringent standards (e.g. Bird Friendly, and 
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Rainforest Certified). These less stringent certification schemes may incentivize buyers to 
abandon the organic and Fair Trade market altogether Therefore, Bolivian coffee 
stakeholders, given the little power they hold on the international organization which 
control price floors and premium prices, may choose to focus on address the issue 
concerning the domestic segment of the organic and Fair Trade market.  
Short Term Financing: One simple way to lower the cost of production at the producer 
level is to expand a financing practice already becoming popular in Bolivia. As discussed 
in section 4.3 the use of prepagos or pre-payments/down payments that producers 
received based on their expected harvest. Prepagos are a simple way to lower the cost of 
production at the producer level.  Expanding this financial practice would allow coffee 
producers to lower cost by saving on interest charged under traditional anticipos. This 
will be an effective way to lower the cost of participation, especially given the situation 
in Yungas where the majority of farmers have been working with the same dedicated 
buyers for decades 
Payment Schedule: Another way of preventing coffee from escaping into the local 
market through rescatistas is to ensure that payments after the harvest are delivered to 
producers in a timely fashion. Producers complained that it takes up to three or four 
months after the coffee harvest before they are paid. Improving the cooperative’s 
administrative capacity is a way of reducing that wait-time.  To improve their 
performance, it is recommended that cooperatives be provided low-cost access to 
bookkeeping and administrative services.  Organic and Fair trade buyers by giving up 
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influence over the payment schedule can allow producers smoother incomes adding to the 
benefit of certification.  
Long-Term Financing:  As previously discussed, low productivity is a major issue 
despite sufficient demand for all the coffee to enter the Fair Trade/Organic market. The 
chief reason for a low output is the declining productivity of old coffee plants. Investing 
in new coffee crops is considered risky and costly for producers. Thus, reducing this cost 
and risk to producers is necessary. This can be accomplished by reducing the 
requirements and interests already being offered in existing loan programs, like those 
available through FINCAFE. At the same time, closer control of the use of the loans is 
necessary to ensure that they are applied to production. 
Certification: The costs of certification and its compliance are added costs for the 
cooperatives, especially the cost of organic certification. The benefits of organic 
certification, however, are broadly shared throughout the agricultural community as 
producers share techniques and protect local and regional environmental resources.  As 
such, the government should subsidize the certification for cooperatives seeking organic 
certification.  
Organization: The manipulation of passive coffee producers is an issue in Bolivia. When 
cooperatives buy coffee from producers who are not associated to them it is in direct 
violation of Fair Trade/Organic standards. The passive producers are necessary for the 
sustainability of the coffee industry given the declining productivity. It would be easy for 
these producers to be assimilated into existing cooperatives. If there is greater 
government support (i.e. the payment for certification), and greater support for financing 
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processing costs, these fees could be lowered or eliminated. Alternatively, the creation of 
a two tiered membership system for active and passive members could be developed. The 
second tier membership would be cheaper, and allows passive producers to deliver coffee 
for the Fair Trade pool, but not for the organic market. 
Coordination: The rising cost of labor and cost of processing are issues facing all 
cooperatives in Bolivia. Stakeholders noted that the majority of the beneficios do not 
operate at capacity. Despite operating below capacity, many cooperatives choose to only 
process coffee from their cooperatives in their facilities. Consequently, those 
cooperatives without beneficios are actively looking for funding to build their own 
facilities.  National organizations and the government should be encouraging 
cooperatives to share facilities as a cost saving measure. Cooperatives will increase the 
economies of scale and reduce costs overall by increasing the amount of coffee processed 
at each beneficio.  A good opportunity to initiate this coordination is the financing of 
automated selection machines, which help to ensure consistent coffee quality and remove 
the need for labor intensive selection. The government could help finance these machines 
among a group of cooperatives if they agree to share a communal beneficio. The savings 
in processing costs can be shared among the cooperatives and passed onto members. 
Section 5.2 Conclusions and Further Research 
In conclusion, the Bolivian coffee market benefits to some extent from participating in 
organic and Fair Trade markets by having access to higher prices. Bolivian producers 
also benefit from a history of dedicated buyers and external investment in the industry. 
Furthermore, these producers retain income stability on account of diversified crop 
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production, including coca.  That being said, Bolivian coffee producers continue to face 
many of the same challenges experienced in other coffee producing countries, including 
increasing cost of production, stagnate premium and price floors, as well as declining 
production. These issues and others contribute to the deterioration of the supply chain, 
which then leads to breakdowns in standards and trust amongst participants. One of the 
contributing factors of weaknesses in the supply chain is the Bolivian government itself.  
Unlike organic and Fair Trade producers in other countries, which benefit from 
government support programs. Bolivian producers do not benefit from government 
support. The government is focused on the development of coffee for domestic 
consumption, the planting of C. robusta coffee to building of processing facilities for 
instant coffee. Government malaise and inaction are among the biggest challenges the 
industry faces. In order to address these issues, institutional reforms within the supply 
chain, as well as greater support from the current administration, are necessary to ensure 
a better functioning Bolivian market. Funding for FONODAL should be dedicated to 
export oriented coffee production in the Yungas region, since this region is where coca is 
currently grown. Furthermore, there is a need for leadership in the coffee industry to 
coordinate efforts and incorporate unaffiliated coffee producers. A sub-ministry or 
reformed FONODAL could provide this leadership to coffee producers in Yungas.  
This research concerned itself primarily with the descriptive analysis of issues in 
Bolivia’s coffee production and providing key insights into the larger issues faced by 
producers in the country. Much of the detailed analysis regarding quantitative metrics of 
cost and well-being of producers are not included. This data was limited due to the 
narrow scope of the present study and the short time period in which it was conducted.  
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Future research in Bolivia should focus on specific levels of income gained from organic 
and/or Fair Trade participation versus non-participation. Additionally, studies may also 
look at the cost of processing and maintaining certification on a cooperative basis, and 
compare these costs across the industry to help justify a proposed shared beneficio as well 
as the investment in automated coffee selecting equipment.  Researchers may consider 
doing a comparative study of the cost of production of coffee versus coca, in terms of net 
revenue, and whether government support is playing a role in the rise of coca prices.
 100
Bibliography 
ACDI/VOCA. (2008). Country History - Bolivia. Washington DC: ACDI/VOCA. 
Bacon, C. M., Mendez, V. E., Sliessman, S. R., Goodman, D., & Fox, J. A. (2008). 
Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Fair Trade, Sustainable Livelihoods, and Ecosystems in 
Mexico and Central America. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: MIT Press. 
Baldwin, J. (2009, Jun 22). Arabica vs. Robusta: No Contest. (T. A. Magazine, Producer) 
Retrieved March 27th, 2015, from The Atlantic: 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2009/06/arabica-vs-robusta-no-contest/19780/ 
Barham, B. L., Callenes, M., Gitter, S., Lewis, J., & Weber, J. (2011). Fair Trade/ 
Organic Coffee, Rural Livelihoods and the "Agrarian Questions" ; Southern Mexican 
Coffee Families in Transiton. World Development , 39 (1), 134-145. 
Bernard, H. R. (2011). Research Methods in Antropology. Plymoth, UK: AltaMira Press. 
Blackman, A., Albers, H., Ávalos-Sartorio, B., & Crooks, L. (2005). Deforestation and 
Shade Coffee in Oaxaca, Mexico. Resources for the Future. Washington DC: Resources 
for the Future. 
Blundell, S. (1998). The No-Nonsense Guild to Fair Trade; New Edition. (C. Brazier, 
Ed.) Oxford, UK: New International Publications. 
Borlaug, N. E. (2000, September 8th). 1 / Special 30 th Anniversary Lecture, The 
Norwegian Nobel Institute, Oslo, September 8, 2000 2/ Distinguished Professor of 
International Agriculture, Texas A&M University; President, Sasakawa Africa 
Association The Green Revolution Revisited and The Road Ahead. Oslo, Norway. 
Bray, D. B., Plaza Sanchez , J. L., & Contreras Murphy, E. (2011). Social Dimensions of 
Organic Coffee Production in Mexico: Lessons for Eco- Labeling Initiatives . Society & 
Natural Resources: An International Journal , 12 (5), 429-446. 
Bray, D. B., Plaza Sanchez, J. L., & Contreras Murphy, E. (2002). Social Dimmensions 
of Organic Coffee Production in Mexico: Lessons for Eco-Labeling Initiatives. Society 
and Natural Resources , 15, 429-446. 
Brooks, D. (2009, January 01). Bolivian Yungas. Retrieved from World Widelife Fund: 
https://www.worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/nt0105 
Catholic Institute for International Relations. (1993). Coca, Cocaine and the War on 
Drugs. Retrieved from http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/failure1993.pdf 
Daviron, B., & Ponte, S. (2005). The Coffee Paradox: Global markets, Commodity 
Trade, and Elusive Promise of Deelopment. New York, NY, USA: Zed Books. 
 101
Dourojeanni, M. (1992, 01 01). Environmental impact of coca cultivation and cocaine 
production in the amazon region of Peru. Retrieved from UNODC: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1992-01-
01_2_page006.html#s001 
Fair Trade International. (2013, January 1). Minimum and Premium Price Information. 
Retrieved February 15, 2015, from fairtrade.net: http://www.fairtrade.net/price-and-
premium-
info.html?no_cache=1&tx_zwo3pricing_pi1%5BproductType%5D=7&tx_zwo3pricing_
pi1%5Bcountry%5D=0&tx_zwo3pricing_pi1%5Bsubmit_button%5D=Go 
Fair Trade International. (2015, January 1). Stronger Producer Stronger Annual Report 
2013-2014. Retrieved April 8, 2015, from FairTrade.net: 
http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/resources/2013-
14_AnnualReport_FairtradeIntl_web.pdf 
Fair Trade USA. (2011, 09 15). Fair Trade USA Resigns Fairtrade International (FLO) 
Membership . (F. T. USA, Producer) Retrieved 07 06, 2015, from Press Release: 
http://fairtradeusa.org/press-room/press_release/fair-trade-usa-resigns-fairtrade-
international-flo-membership 
FAOSTAT. (2011, October 23). Bolivia Country Profile. Rome, Italy. Retrieved March 
10, 2015, from http://faostat.fao.org/site/666/default.aspx 
FAOSTAT. (2013, October). Food and Agriculture Production . (F. a. Organization, 
Producer) Retrieved 07 07, 2015, from Food and Agriculture Production by Country: 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx 
Farthing, L. C., & Kohl, B. H. (2014). Evo's Bolivia: Contiuity and Change. Autin, TX: 
University of Texas Press. 
FLOCERT. (2015, April 20). Small Producers Organization Fees. Retrieved from 
FLOCERT.net: http://www.flocert.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/PC-FeeSysSPO-ED-
26-en1.pdf 
Fridell, G. (2007). Fair trade coffee : the prospects and pitfalls of market-driven social 
justice. Toronto: Toronto University Press. 
Friedland, W. H. (1984). The End of Rural Society and the Future of Rural Sociology. 
Rural Sociology , 47 (4), 598-608. 
Gary, G. (1999). International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel commodity 
chain . Journal of International Economics , 48 (1), 37-70. 
Gliessman, S. R. (2007). Agroecological Foundation for Designing Sustainable Coffee 
Agroecosystems. In C. M. Bacon, V. E. Mendez, S. R. Gliessman , & J. A. Fox, 
Confronting the Coffee Crisis (pp. 27-41). Cambrige, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
 102
Gore, C. (2000). The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for 
Developing Countires. World Development , 28 (5), 789-804. 
International Coffee Organizaation. (2010, Jan 1). World Coffee Trade. Retrieved Sept 
15, 2014, from International Coffee Organization: 
www.ico.org/trade_e.asp?sections=about_coffee 
Jaffee, D. (2007). Brewing Justice. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Jose, S. (2009). Agroforestry for ecosystem services and environmental benefits; an 
overview. Agroforesty Systems , 76, 1-10. 
Kuepper, G. (2015, March 29). A Brief Overview of the History and Philosophy of 
Organic Agriculture. Poteui, OK. 
Laurte, F. (1983). Sur les Estudes de Filieres Agro-alimentaire . Economies et Societes 
Cahiers de I'lSMEA , 17, 721-740. 
Lima, A. M. (1997). The Coca Debate and Yungas Landowners during the First Half of 
the Twenieth Century. In M. Leon, & H. Sanabria, Coca, Cocaine and the Bolivian 
Reality (pp. 99-115). Albany, NY: State University of New York. 
Martinez-Torres, M. E. (2008). The Benefits and Sustainbaility of Organic Farming by 
Peasant Coffee Farmers in Chiapas, Mexico. In C. M. Bacon, V. E. Mendez, S. R. 
Gliessman, D. Goodman, & J. A. Fox (Eds.), Confronting the Coffee Crisis (pp. 99 -126). 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
MDRyT. (2011, 01 01). Ministerio de Desarrollo Rurual Y Tierras. Retrieved Feburary 
1, 2015, from RESULTADOS DEL CENSO NACIONAL DEL CAFÉ • 2011/2012: 
http://observatorio.agrobolivia.gob.bo/docuemntos%20oap/menu%20izquierda/Censos/ca
fe/cafe_11_06.pdf 
Mendez, V. E., Bacon, C. M., Olson, M., Petchers, S., Herrador, D., Carranza , C., et al. 
(2010). Effects of Fair Trade and organic certifications on small-scale coffee farmer 
households in Central America and Mexico. Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems , 
25 (03), 236-251. 
Miranda-Castro, L., & Padron, S. (205). From the Mountains to the Sea: Restoring 
Shades Coffee Plantations to Protect Tropical Costas Ecosystems. United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior. Washington DC: IEEE. 
Monsen, L. (2003). USAID Coffe Program in Bolivia Produces Dramatic Income Gains 
for Farmers . Washington DC: USAID. 
Mutersbaugh, T. (2002). The number is the beast; a political economy of organic- coffee 
certification and producers unionism. Environment and Planning , 34, 1165-1184. 
 103
O'Brien, T. G., & Kinnaird, M. F. (2003). Caffiene and Conservation. Science , 300 
(5619), 587. 
Perfecto, I., Rice, R., Greenberg, R., & Van der Vooty, M. E. (1196). Shade Coffee: A 
Disappearing Refuge for Biodiversity. BioScience , 46 (8), 598-608. 
Petchers, S., & Harris, S. (2005). The Roots of the Coffee Crisis. In C. Bacon, V. E. 
Mendez, S. R. Gliessman, D. Goodman, & J. F. Fox, Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Fair 
Trade, Sustainability Livelihoods, and Ecosystems in Mexico and Centeral Americad (pp. 
43-65). Boston, MA: MIT Press. 
Pierrot , J., Giovannucci , D., & Kasterine , A. (2011). Trend in Trade of Certified 
Coffees. International Trade Center. Geneva: International Trade Center. 
Raynolds, L. T. (2002). Consumer/Producer Links in Fair Trade Coffee. Sociologia 
Ruralis , 24 (4), 404-424. 
Raynolds, L. T. (2000). Re-embedding global agriculture: The international organic and 
fair trade movements. Agriculture and Human Values , 17, 297-309. 
Raynolds, L. T. (2004). The Globalization of Organic Agro-Food Networks. World 
Development , 32 (5), 725-734. 
Raynolds, L. T., Murray, D., & Helller, A. (2007). REgulating sustainability in the coffee 
sector: A comparative analysis of third-party environmental and social certifications 
initiatives. Agriculture and Human Values , 24, 147-163. 
Rice, R. (1999). A Place Unbecoming: The Coffee Farm of Northern Latin America. 
Geographics Review , 89 (5), 554-579. 
Sanabria, H. (1993). The Coca Boom and Rural Social Change in Bolivia . (E. F. Moran, 
Ed.) Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press. 
Schwarts, S. (2012). Middle Ground or Native Ground? Material Culture at Iowaville. 
Ethnohistory , 60 (4), 537-565 . 
Soto-Pinto, L., Anzueto, M., Mendoza, J., Jimenez Ferrer, G., & de Jong, B. (2009). 
Carbon sequestration through agroforestry in indigenous communities of Chiapas, 
Mexico. Agroforest Systems , 78, 39-51. 
Talbot, J. M. (1997). Grounds for Agreement Political Economy of the Coffee Commodity 
Chain. Oxford, UK: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Taylor, P. L., Murray, D. L., & Raynolds, L. T. (2005). Keeping trade fair: goverance 
challenges in the Fair Trade coffee initiative. Sustainable Development , 13 (3), 199-208. 
Toledo, V. M., & Moguel, P. (2012). Coffee and Sustainability: The Multiple Values of 
Traditional Shaded Coffee. (S. Gliessman, Ed.) Journal of Sustainale Agriculture , 36 (3), 
353-377. 
 104
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2005-2014, June 1). Estado Plurinacional 
de Bolivia Movimiento de Cultivos de Coca Report 2005-2014. Retrieved Febrary 14, 
2015, from UNODC Illicit Crop Monitoring: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crop-
monitoring/index.html?tag=Bolivia 
USAID Bolivia. (2013). Building a better Future. La Paz, Bolivia: United States Agency 
for International Development. 
Varangis, P., Sigel, P., Giovannucci, D., & Lewin, B. (2003, March). Dealing with the 
Coffee Crisis in Central America. Retrieved April 10, 2015, from World Bank: 
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jgnpnnywu_QC&oi=fnd&pg=PP9&dq=
government+support+coffee+central+america&ots=VWxDjq9Ckc&sig=SNhruBn21heL
UnCuafnD6zVMgaE#v=onepage&q&f=false 
Williams, R. G. (1994). States and Social Evolution: Coffee and the Rise of National 
Governments in Central America. Chapal Hill : UNC Press. 
World Bank. (2015, February 3). Overview of Commodity Market Pink Sheets. Retrieved 
February 16, 2015, from worldbank.org: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,c
ontentMDK:21574907~menuPK:7859231~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSiteP
K:476883,00.html 
World Bank Poverty Working Group. (2015). Poverty headcount ratio at national 
poverty lines (% of population). Retrieved Febuary 15, 2015, from data.worldbank.org: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC/countries/PE-CO-PY-UY-
EC?display=graph 
Yucra, M. A. (2012, 01 01). Vice Ministerio de Coca y Desarrollo Integral. Retrieved 
March 10th, 2015, from http://www.vcdi.gob.bo/archivopaps/Informe%20Final%20-
%20Programa%20Productivo%20para%20los%20Yungas%20-%201.pdf 
 
  
